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State Law of Patent Exploitation*
Edward H. Cooper**
Patents scare many lawyers. Mental charts of the law are
apt to designate this unexplored territory as a federal enclave,
peopled by dragons and serpents of purely federal origin. Even
a timid glance into the unknown land, however, reveals the
friendly wagging tail of state contract law, both common and
statutory. At least a living ghost of state tort law lingers in
these lands too. For, surprising as it may seem, it is well es-
tablished that most aspects of contractual transactions affecting
patents are governed by state law. State law has likewise af-
forded tort remedies for a variety of wrongs by and against
patent owners, although the prospects for survival of such rem-
edies against the onslaught of federal preemption seem dim.
The main purpose of the present inquiry is to determine
whether second thoughts support or undermine the instinctive
supposition that the doctrines surrounding cooperative use of
patents should be federal. The original creator of a patented
invention is seldom in a position to exploit its commercial po-
tential alone; even if the invention is created by the employee
of a vast enterprise, it is almost inevitable that the patent will
be assigned to his employer. Patent licensing plays a vitally
important role in the development of many inventions. The con-
tract doctrines surrounding such transactions, and various other
consensual undertakings relating to patents, can obviously af-
* NOTE: The text of this article has been written for reading
without reference to the footnotes. The footnotes themselves have
proliferated in unseemly number because it is hoped that readers of
quite diverse backgrounds will be intrigued by the questions addressed.
The ordinary digression, documentation, elaboration, and interesting
snippets furnished by footnotes have thus been expanded to serve both
those who are primarily interested in patent law, and those who are
fascinated by any complex problem of judicial federalism.
** Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. The
author wishes to express deep appreciation to his colleague, Professor
Charles W. Wolfram, who reviewed a draft of this article and made
several helpful suggestions. Mr. Richard L Diamond contributed in-
valuable research assistance.
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feet the value of the patent in significant ways. Unduly restric-
tive state laws, or wide divergences between the laws of dif-
ferent states, could pose a very real danger of unduly diminish-
ing the value of federally granted patents. And conversely,
we are repeatedly reminded that there is a strong public inter-
est in ensuring that private arrangements affecting patents not
be allowed to make the patents too valuable by improperly in-
creasing the rewards the patentee is able to extract from his
statutory "monopoly." To some extent, indeed, misuse and anti-
trust doctrines have already federalized the law of patent trans-
actions in response to this second danger. Similar dangers of un-
due extension or restriction of patent rights, moreover, may be
found whenever state courts rule on the scope or validity of a
patent.
Given these theoretical threats to paramount federal inter-
ests, why should not the entire law of patent transactions be
taken over as a new area in the rapidly expanding domain of
federal common law? There has never been a deliberate ex-
ploration of this question. Instead, the answer was given more
than a century ago in decisions defining the allocation of juris-
diction in patent matters between state and federal courts. Much
has happened since then in the substance of patent law, in the
character and extent of commercial dealings in patents, and in
the nature of our perceptions about the relations between
state and federal law. Exploration of the question today sug-
gests that on balance there is a moderately persuasive case to
be made for federalization of most of the body of contract law
affecting transactions in patent rights. The imbalance between
the claims of state and federal law is not sufficient, however, to
justify preemption by judicial decision. Instead, if federaliza-
tion is to occur it should result from a political judgment by
Congress. Paradoxically, it will also be concluded that the
most desirable form of Congressional action would be, not a
patent code, but a statute explicitly designed to authorize
creation of a federal common law.
These conclusions will be supported in the following pages
by an examination of present jurisdictional doctrines and their
origins; a description of the general areas in which state law
now controls patent exploitation; an attempted sketch of the
competing forces pulling toward application of state or federal
law; and a suggestion of the reasons for preferring Congres-
sional resolution of the question.
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I. STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
IN PATENT MATTERS
A. MAw LNs OF DIVISION1
1. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
Today it is dearly provided by statute that federal juris-
diction is exclusive over all actions brought for patent infringe-
ment as such.2 Exclusive jurisdiction is ordinarily attributed to
suppositions that federal courts possess a greater expertise in
the often highly technical questions raised by patent law; that
uniform interpretation and application of patent law may be
promoted by limiting the nature of the tribunals in which suit
may be brought and by easing the availability of federal appel-
late review at some level; and that there is a strong public
interest in correctly defining the limits of the rights conferred
by a patent "monopoly" which increases the need for uniformity
and expertise beyond the need arising from mere concern with
the interests of the parties to the infringement suit.
3
However logical and weighty these reasons may seem as a
1. General treatment of the division of jurisdiction between fed-
eral and state courts in matters affecting patents may be found in
Amdur, Patent Litigation in Federal and State Courts, 2 GEo. WASH. L
REV. 35 (1933); Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State
and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. RIv. 633 (1971);
Note, The Enforcement of Rights Against Patent Infringers, 72 HAnv. L
REv. 328, 328-31 (1958); Note, The Jurisdiction of State Courts Over
Cases Involving Patents, 31 COLM. L. REV. 461 (1931); Annot., 167
A.L.R. 1114 (1947). Cf. AL NmmR, Nni R ON COPYRIGHT § 131.11
(1963).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1970). Federal jurisdiction over such matters
as actions to compel issuance of a patent, direct review of Patent Office
proceedings and actions growing out of interference proceedings be-
tween rival claimants for patent protection of the same invention poses
no problem for the matters discussed here and will be ignored.
3. See Chisun, supra note 1; Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 HAnv. L. Rlv. 509 (1957).
The American Law Institute relies heavily on the expertise of federal
courts and on the "federal interest in the monopoly conferred by the
patent ... that is more important than the wishes of the parties" in
proposing to maintain the exclusivity of federal patent infringement
jurisdiction. See ALI, STny OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTON BETWEzN
STAT AND FEDER.L CoURTs § 1311(b) at 183 (1968). Somewhat dif-
ferent evaluations of this proposal may be found in D. Currie, The Fed-
eral Courts and the American Law Institute: Part II, 36 U. CHi. L. REv.
268, 280 (1969); D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Si-
mons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. Cur. L. REv. 26, 51 n.115 (1966).
The possibility that state judges might be heartily glad to avoid
such cases should not be lost from sight. Compare Wright, Federal
Question Jurisdiction, 17 S.C.L. REv. 660, 663 (1965).
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justification for retaining an exclusive federal jurisdiction,"
the important point for immediate purposes is that there is very
little indication that the original development of an exclusive
federal jurisdiction reflected any studied conclusion that state
courts should be kept distant from the area of patent law. On
the contrary, the determination that federal jurisdiction was ex-
clusive was made by judicial decision long before it was explic-
itly embodied in statutory form, for reasons which indicate little
if any distrust of state courts. This fact may help account for
the development of broad state court jurisdiction over matters
affecting patents other than infringement and for the concomi-
tant determinations that state law controls such matters. A very
brief review of the historic development should serve to illus-
trate this point.
The first patent statute, enacted in 1790, provided that
infringers should "forfeit and pay . . . such damages as shall
be assessed by a jury . . . which may be recovered in an action
on the case founded on this act."5  Modern commentators have
viewed this statute as creating either concurrent state and fed-
eral jurisdiction 6 or exclusive state jurisdiction.7 The consid-
erably revised patent statute of 1793, however, explicitly pro-
vided for recovery of treble damages "in an action on the case
founded on this act, in the circuit court of the United States, or
any other court having competent jurisdiction." s
This clear sharing of jurisdiction with state courts was soon
erased. The Act of 1800 provided, among other things, for a dif-
ferent measure of damages, and for an action on the case
founded on the Act of 1793 and the Act of 1800 "in the circuit
court of the United States. . . ."9 For a variety of reasons noted
below, state courts soon began to interpret this statute as con-
ferring exclusive federal jurisdiction over infringement ac-
tions. The statute extending the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to embrace equitable remedies for infringement in 1819
provided that "all actions" arising under the patent laws should
be cognizable in the federal courts.10 This language was re-
4. See Part III (B) infra.
5. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111.
6. Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private
Civil Actions, 70 HARv. L. REV. 509, 510 n.2 (1957).
7. Chisum, supra note 1, 635-36.
8. Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322.
9. Act of April 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38.
10. Act of February 15, 1819, ch. 29, 3 Stat. 481.
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peated in the statutes of 1836 and 1870.11 It was only in the
Revised Statutes of 1874 that an explicit provision was added
stating that federal jurisdiction was exclusive of the courts of
the several states.1
2
Deletion of the explicit 1793 authorization of suits in "any
court having competent jurisdiction" from the otherwise highly
similar language of the 1800 statute offers an obvious ground to
suppose that Congress did indeed intend to make the federal
jurisdiction exclusive.13 State courts were prompt to reach this
general conclusion, although for reasons which do not suggest
any clear thought that the federal courts had any particular
expertise, ability to develop uniformity of doctrine, or position
to protect the public interest.14 To be sure, some emphasis
was placed on the inappropriateness of exercising the statutory
power to declare patents void,'; but the fact that state courts
were concurrently exercising that power in cases other than in-
fringement actions' 6 demonstrates that no particular import-
11. Act of July 4, 1836, cb. CCCLV, § 17, 5 Stat. 117, 124; Act of
July 8, 1870, cb. CCXXX, § 55, 16 Stat. 206.
12. Act of June 22, 1874, tit. XII, ch. 12, § 711, 18 Stat. (Part 1)
134- It has been said that there was a period during which some attor-
neys were uncertain whether the general federal question jurisdiction
statute of 1875 returned concurrent jurisdiction to the state courts.
See 3 WALKER ON PATENs § 412, at 1601-02 (A. Deller ed. 1937).
Doubts were apparently laid to rest by the rather obscure decision of
In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 662 (1893).
13. See Chisum, supra note 1, at 636; Note, The Jurisdiction of
State Courts Over Cases Involving Patents, 31 COLmL L. RIv. 461 n.1
(1931). In Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 620 (1195), the Court
assumed that exclusive federal jurisdiction was created, at least for
actions at law, by the Act of 1800 and was extended to equitable reme-
dies by the Act of 1819. (The possibility that equitable relief might
be given on the basis of diversity jurisdiction was left open in Living-
ston v. Van Ingen, 15 F. Cas. 697 (No. 8,420) (D.N.Y. 1811). Whether
this implies that state courts could have granted like remedies remains
a matter for conjecture.)
14. In Darst v. Brockway, 11 Ohio Rep. 462, 466 (1842), the court
granted relief by cancelling notes given for patents found to be void,
noting that the legal principles involved in the patent inquiry "are
questions not very common to the courts of this state" and that their
proper application was less familiar than many other principles of more
frequent use. No similar expressions of concern for lack of state court
expertise have been found. Commentators of this period generally as-
sumed that federal jurisdiction was exclusive without offering any
explanation of why it should be so. E.g., G. CuRm, TATMS- ON THE
LAW or PATENTS § 406 (1849); 3 J. KENT, Coz nwETA1is ON AinmucAN
LAw 368 (11th ed. 1867); W. PHILLips, LAW or PATENTS 378-81 (1837).
15. See Parsons v. Barnard, 7 Johns. 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1810). A
rather confused statement may be found in Burrall v. Jewett, 2 Paige's
Chan. Rep. 134 (N.Y. 1830).
16. See text accompanying notes 30-35 infra.
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ance was attached to this theory. Other reasons commonly of-
fered were that it was inappropriate for state courts to enforce
a federal statute providing for treble damages, 17 that exclusivity
should be implied from the fact that the statute which created
the right specifically designated the circuit courts for its en-
forcement, 8 and that somehow there was a need for contin-
uing legislative supervision over patents which counseled against
state jurisdiction. 19 After enactment of the 1819 statute, empha-
sis was also placed on the fact that it provided for federal "cog-
nizance" of "all actions" arising under the patent laws. 20
The evidence offered by the above history that there was
no strong concern for the consequences of allowing state courts
to interpret the scope of federally granted patents and to pass
on their validity is largely negative. More positive evidence
is afforded by the companion line of cases, next to be examined,
delineating a large area of "exclusive" state court jurisdiction
over suits involving patent rights.
2. Exclusive State Jurisdiction
Absent federal diversity jurisdiction, state courts have "ex-
clusive" original jurisdiction over a wide variety of suits in-
volving contracts affecting patent rights or involving tort claims
arising out of interference with business relations in which pa-
tent rights are implicated. Supreme Court review of such cases
is available only if they turn on a question of federal patent
law such as the scope or validity of a patent. To be sure,
many of these suits can be brought within the exclusive original
federal jurisdiction by adroit pleading of a claim for infringe-
ment.21 The main conceptual lines dividing jurisdiction, how-
ever, are those neatly summarized in the most recent restate-
ment by the Supreme Court:
[W]here a patentee complainant makes his suit one for recovery
of royalties under a contract of license or assignment, or for
damages for a breach of its covenants, or for a specific per-
formance thereof, or asks the aid of the Court in declaring a
forfeiture of the license or in restoring an unclouded title to
17. E.g., Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N.Y. 9 (1849); Parsons v. Bar-
nard, 7 Johns. 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810); Rice v. Garnhart, 34 Wis. 453,
464 (1874).
18. E.g., Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N.Y. 9 (1849); Parsons v. Barnard,
7 Johns. 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
19. Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N.Y. 9 (1849).
20. Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60 (1869); Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N.Y.
9 (1849).
21. See Part I(B) infra.
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the patent, he does not give the federal district court jurisdic-
tion of the cause as one arising under the patent laws.22
Several early decisions in the lower federal courts dismiss-
ing suits on patent contracts for want of subject matter juris-
diction pointed the way to this division,23 but it was not until
1850 that the Supreme Court spoke its first words on the matter.
In Wilson v. Sandford24 the patent owner brought suit against
a licensee, claiming forfeiture for failure to make required pay-
ments and praying a decree setting aside the license and relief
against continued practice of the invention as infringement.
The Court dismissed an attempted appeal from the lower court
on the ground that the suit did not involve the $2,000 required
to give it appellate jurisdiction if the suit were not one
arising under federal patent statutes. The dispute was said
not to arise out of any statute, but out of the license contract,
"and there is no act of Congress providing for or regulating
contracts of this kind. The rights of the parties depend alto-
gether upon common law and equity principles."2 5
Subsequent leading cases involving denial of original fed-
eral jurisdiction or approval of state jurisdiction are noted
in the margin.2 6 There is seldom any reflection of concern for
22. Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 510-11 (1926). The
Court notes that it is not disposed to depart from the established rule,
"whatever might be our conclusion if it were a new question." Id.
at 511.
23. Probably the leading early case is Burr v. Gregory, 4 F. Cas.
813 (No. 2,191) (S.D.N.Y. 1828), where the court ruled that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction of a suit for specific performance of a con-
tract to assign an interest in a patent. Two particularly interesting
post-1850 cases are Goodyear v. Union India Rubber Co., 10 F. Cas. 726
(No. 5,586) (S.D.N.Y. 1857) (no federal jurisdiction of suit to recover
unpaid royalties on patent license), and Merserole v. Union Paper
Collar Co., 17 F. Cas. 153 (No. 9,488) (S.D.N.Y. 1869).
24. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99 (1850).
25. Id. at 101-02.
26. Several cases ruled that suits for royalties due on a patent
assignment were not in the federal jurisdiction. E.g., Odell v. F. C.
Farnsworth Co., 250 U.S. 501 (1919); Briggs v. United Shoe Mach. Co.,
239 U.S. 48 (1915); Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613 (1882). Other cases
denying federal jurisdiction include, e.g., Muskegon Piston Ring Co. v.
Olsen, 307 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 952 (1963)
(claims of ownership of the invention underlying conflicting patent and
pending patent application); Cincinnati Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Vigorith,
212 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1954) (suit to compel assignment); Leaver v.
Parker, 121 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 700 (1942)
(suit involving construction of license agreement).
At one time there was some indication that the Supreme Court
would attempt to enforce the jurisdictional lines it was drawing by
refusing to allow a party to a patent contract to ignore the contract and
sue for infringement. See Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U.S. 547 (1878).
1972]
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preserving the power of state courts.27 Instead, the basic theme
is simply that reflected in Wilson v. Sandford: federal statutes
do not provide for contracts affecting patents apart from a few
details for recording assignments, 28 and such matters are ac-
cordingly left to state courts and state law. By the same token,
state court decisions in such cases are not subject to Supreme
Court review if they do not involve questions of patent law.20
The most dramatic consequence of these jurisdictional lines
is that state courts are regularly called upon to determine the
scope and validity of federal patents. The Supreme Court has
clearly blessed such state power,30 and indeed has occasionally
remanded cases appealed from state courts for an initial deter-
mination by the state courts of questions of patent validity in
order to provide the basis for its own further review.3 ' The
most frequent occasion for state court construction of the scope
of patents is provided by the fact that, barring contrary agree-
ment, license royalty provisions are construed to apply to any
conduct which would otherwise be an infringement and to
As discussed at length in Part I(B), infra, however, optional resort to
federal jurisdiction by framing a claim for infringement has been made
rather freely available.
Basic statements approving the exercise of state court jurisdiction
include the leading decision in American Well Works Co. v. Layne &
Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916), where the Court upheld removal to
federal court on the ground that state courts originally had jurisdiction
of an action for interference with the plaintiff's business by threatening
its customers with suits for infringement of the defendant's patent.
See also New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 473(1912) (approval of state court jurisdiction of a suit to compel as-
signment of a patent).
Among the more interesting state court statements are: Coleman
v. Whisnant, 225 N.C. 494, 35 S.E.2d 647 (1945); Middlebrook v. Broad-
bent, 47 N.Y. 443 (1872); Van Prods. Co. v. General Welding & Fabri-
cating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965); Slemmer's Appeal, 58
Pa. St. 155 (1868).
27. But see the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice White in Henry
v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 49 (1912).
28. See text accompanying note 177 infra.
29. See Wade v. Lawder, 165 U.S. 624 (1897) (suit to rescind con-
tract to assign interest in pending patent application); Marsh v.
Nichols, Shepard & Co., 140 U.S. 344, 354, 359 (1891) (suit to enforce
contract to release all claims arising at any time out of use of patented
invention); Felix v. Scharnweber, 125 U.S. 54 (1888) (suit to recover
royalties on agreement between co-owners of patent); Dale Tile Mfg.
Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46 (1888) (suit on license to collect royalties).
30. The leading statement is found in Pratt v. Paris Gas Light &
Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897). Cf. Pan American Petrol. Corp. v.
Superior Court, 366 U.S. 656 (1961).
31. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 675-76 (1969); MacGregor v.
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 406 n.4, 407 (1947).
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nothing else.3 2 Historically, determinations as to validity have
occurred most frequently in cases involving attempts to avoid
liability on promises to pay for a patent assignment, although
such determinations have occurred in other contexts as well. 33
32. E.g., Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 906-16, 435 P.2d 321,
336-41, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545, 560-65 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395
U.S. 653 (1969); Perbal v. Dazor Mfg. Corp., 436 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. Sup.
Ct. 1968); American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Ampto, Inc., 82 N.J. Super.
531, 198 A.2d 469, 475 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964);
Shaw v. E. I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 Vt. 206, 226 A.2d 903
(1966) (rehearing heard in 1967). See R. ELLIS, PATENT LIcENsEs § 115
(A. Deller ed. 1958). It is occasionally suggested that a patent should
be construed more liberally in suits between licensor and licensee.
E.g., Morpul, Inc. v. Mayo Knitting Mill, Inc., 265 N.C. 257, 266, 143
S.E.2d 707, 714 (1965). Compare R. NoaDHAus, PATENT LIcENSE AcRE-
MNirs: LAw & FORMS 121 (1967) (licensee may agree not to contest
the scope of patent claims). This proposition is probably superseded
by the general abolition of licensee estoppel. See note 34 infra.
33. Early cases involving attempts to avoid paying for patent
rights include Nye v. Raymond, 16 Ill. 153 (1854); McClure v. Jeffrey,
8 Ind. 79 (1856); Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60 (1869); Dickinson v. Hall,
31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 217 (1833); Bliss v. Negus, 8 Mass. 46 (1811); Jol-
liffe v. Collins, 21 Mo. 338, 343 (1855); Dunbar v. Marden, 13 N.H. 311
(1842); Earl v. Page, 6 N.H. 477 (1834); Middlebrook v. Broadbent,
47 N.Y. 443 (1872) (seeking to cancel note given for patent right and
to recover on "bond" conditioned on validity of patent); Darst v. Brock-
way, 11 Ohio Rep. 462 (1842); Rice v. Garnhart, 34 Wis. 453, 464, 465
(1874) (defense to suit for royalties due for assignment). An occa-
sional maverick opinion can be found ruling that exclusive federal
infringement jurisdiction impliedly excluded state court consideration of
patent validity. See Elmer v. Pennel, 40 Me. 430, 434-35 (1855); Note,
The Jurisdiction of State Courts in Cases Arising Under the Patent-
Right Laws, 4 CENTRAL L.J. 555 (1877). [The Maine Court reneged in
Carleton v. Bird, 94 Me. 182, 189, 47 A. 154, 156 (1900).]
Rulings on patent validity also occurred in various contexts of li-
cense litigation. E.g., Rich v. Hotchkiss, 16 Conn. 409 (1844) (suit to
restrain operations beyond the scope of a limited license); Eno v.
Prime Mfg. Co., 314 Mass. 686, 50 N.E.2d 401 (1943) (no damages re-
sult from operations after termination of license since patent is invalid);
Sherman v. Champlain Transp. Co., 31 Vt. 162, 174 (1858) (semble).
Notwithstanding the clear power of state courts to rule on patent
validity, various devices have been employed to avoid the need for such
rulings. The most direct limitation has been found in decisions that
state courts may not entertain affirmative requests for declaratory de-
terminations of validity or invalidity. E.g., Leesona Corp. v. Concordia
Mfg. Co., 312 F. Supp. 392 (D.R.L 1970); Pleatmaster, Inc. v. Consoli-
dated Trimming Corp., 156 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1956). State courts
confronted with difficult questions of patent validity may voluntarily
stay proceedings to facilitate resort to federal courts for declaratory
judgment rulings. E.g., Adkins v. United States Dist. Court, 431 F.2d
859 (9th Cir. 1970); Talbot v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 967,
968 (3d Cir. 1939). Likewise, state courts may defer determination of
patent law questions affecting contract rights to a patent to determina-
tion by the Patent Office. See Republic Engr'g & Mfg. Co. v. Moskovitz,
376 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. App.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 837 (1964). Cf. Maxim
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Following the complete abrogation of the doctrine that a licen-
see sued for royalties is estopped to challenge the validity of the
licensed patent,34 however, it may be anticipated that state
courts will be called upon to answer questions of patent validity
in a considerable volume of license litigation.3"
These jurisdictional lines indicate clearly that the federal
courts have not been anxious to ensure that all cases involving
the validity or scope of patents be brought within the reach of
the uniformity-creating expertise of original federal jurisdiction.
The clear lack of concern with state adjudication of such mat-
ters has even led state courts to grant injunctive relief against
future patent infringement where that has seemed an appro-
priate form of contract relief,36 and has led federal courts to
accord collateral estoppel effect to state court determinations
of patent law issues when the issues have been decided in state
litigation and the same issues have recurred in federal infringe-
ment litigation.37
v. E.L. Tebbets Spool Co., 132 Me. 398, 171 A. 698 (1934); Grob v. Con-
tinental Mach. Specialties, Inc., 204 Minn. 459, 283 N.W. 774 (1939).
34. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). The decision in Lear
seems clearly to preclude private license agreements that the licensee
will not challenge the validity of the licensed patent. E.g., Beckman
Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Development Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 59 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971).
35. Such questions had already arisen in the various contexts in
which state courts allowed rather uncertain avenues around the gen-
eral doctrines of licensee estoppel. E.g., Crew v. Flanagan, 242 Minn.
549, 65 N.W.2d 878 (1954) (estoppel terminated by licensee's repudia-
tion of the license).
36. E.g., New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S.
473 (1912); H.J. Heinz Co. v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 164, 266
P.2d 5 (1954); Battelle Development Corp. v. Angevine-Funke, Inc.,
165 U.S.P.Q. 776 (Ohio Com. P1. 1970). See Hold Stitch Fabric Mach.
Co. v. May Hosiery Mills, 184 Tenn. 19, 28, 195 S.W.2d 18, 22, cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 759 (1946).
37. The case putting this issue squarely is Vanderveer v. Erie
Malleable Iron Co., 238 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
937 (1957), ruling that a prior state court determination that a licen-
see did not owe royalties on a particular product was binding in later
federal litigation charging infringement in continued production of the
same product. See also Cavicchi v. Mohawk Mfg. Co., 34 F. Supp. 852
(S.D.N.Y. 1940).
The result in Vanderveer seems correct so long as federal courts
are entirely willing to cede jurisdiction of patent contract litigation to
state courts. The underlying jurisdictional rulings indicate that no vi-
tal importance is attached to the possible need for uniform, expert
federal rulings. For this reason, it seems essential to distinguish the
patent situation from other situations involving exclusive federal juris-
diction, a point overlooked in most discussions of the estoppel effects of
state court rulings in later litigation brought under some head of ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction. E.g., Note, State Court's Finding on Patent
[Vol. 56:313
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Finally, there are a few situations in which the owner of a
patent interest which could probably be enforced as an infringe-
ment claim within the exclusive federal jurisdiction has been
allowed to proceed on a state law tort theory. Thus in one
very recent case a state law theory of interference with ad-
vantageous relations was held to be available to a patentee who
preferred for procedural reasons to waive a claim for inducing
infringement.3 8 Such theories will be discussed at greater
length below;39 for the moment, they offer a final illustration
of the lack of federal judicial concern for preserving any ef-
fective exclusive federal jurisdiction over questions of patent
law.
This sketch of the basic jurisdictional lines seems sufficient
to establish the framework for stating, and then analyzing, the
areas in which state law controls the exploitation of patent
rights. Readers who are not interested in the minutiae of juris-
Inf7ingement Held Binding In Later Federal Action, 57 COLUm. L. Rsv.
585 (1957); Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Pri-
vate Civil Actions, 70 HaRv. L. REv. 509, 514-15 (1957); Note, Res Judi-
cata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State-Court
Determinations, 53 VA. L. Rv. 1360 (1967); Comment, Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction: The Effect of State Court Findings, 8 STAN. L. REv. 439
(1956).
Quite different considerations apply to state court determinations
of matters which, unlike rulings as to the scope of a patent, are gov-
erned by state law. As noted at length in Part II, infra, such mat-
ters as the ownership of inventions and the existence of license agree-
ments are governed by state law; when a state court has ruled in such
an area, the conclusion that estoppel effect should be extended in later
federal patent litigation seems to follow easily. E.g., Becher v. Con-
toure Labs., Inc., 279 U.S. 388 (1929); Nelson v. Swing-A-Way Mfg. Co.,
266 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1959); Talbot v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Co.,
104 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1939); Zachs v. Aronson, 49 F. Supp. 696 (D.
Conn. 1943). Cf. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Robbins Music Corp., 146 F.2d 400,
401 (2d Cir. 1944) (dictum in copyright case).
No cases have been found dealing with the estoppel effect of state
court findings as to patent validity. The recommendation by the
President's Commission on the Patent System that "in rem" effect be
given to rulings of invalidity was limited to rulings in a federal court.
See PxsmDEN'S CoMMIssION ON THE PATENzT SYSTEM, "To Promote the
Progress of ... Useful Arts," Recommendation XXIII, S. Doc. No. 5,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). In its recent ruling that the doctrine
of mutuality of estoppel should no longer be generally applied to pre-
clude a nonparty from taking advantage of a prior ruling of patent
invalidity, the Supreme Court gave no indication whether a different
rule might be applied to state court determinations. See Blonder-
Tongue Labs, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
38. Koratron Co. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 418 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 909 (1970). See text accompanying note 239
infra.
39. See text accompanying notes 239-40 infra.
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dictional rulings may easily proceed directly to the discussion
in Part II. For the sake of balance, however, the remainder
of this first section will be devoted to a brief sketch of the
ways in which the basic lines have been blurred. If the picture
painted above has seemed one of nonconcern for the conse-
quences of relegating questions of patent law to state court de-
termination, the picture painted by the decisions allowing state
jurisdiction to be avoided by careful pleading of an infringement
claim seems one of almost gay insouciance for the jurisdictional
lines which originally helped determine the respective spheres
of state and federal law.
The main present significance of the basic jurisdictional
lines and of their subsequent meanders is not that there is an
urgent need to return to sound first principles of jurisdictional
allocation. There is ample room to argue that there is no sig-
nificant cost entailed in occasional state adjudication of issues
of federal patent law. Additionally, any cost is far outweighed
by the resulting benefits of freeing the federal courts from an
overextension of infringement jurisdiction to a great many
contract cases which in the end would not involve any issues
of federal law whatever. The point is simply that there has in-
deed been an implicit determination by the federal courts that
federal law should not extend to all aspects of transactions af-
fecting patents. Since state law governs many aspects of such
transactions, subject only to such infrequent Supreme Court
review as may be practicably available, the desirability of ex-
clusive state determination of such matters prevails over any
possible losses in permitting state courts to determine federal
patent matters as well.
B. BLURRING THE JURISDICTIONAL LINES 4
0
The fact that state law controls most aspects of the con-
tractual relationships created by patent licenses and assign-
ments has not precluded resort to federal nondiversity jurisdic-
tion for suits growing out of such relationships. Undoubtedly
one effect of the various doctrines allowing such evasion of the
basic jurisdictional lines is desirable, at least in the eyes of
those who believe in the superiority of federal adjudication of
questions of patent validity and coverage-very often, a party
40. A recent discussion somewhat paralleling the themes developed
below is Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REv. 633, 644-50 (1971).
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who wishes to take advantage of the federal courts may do so.4 1
To the extent that state jurisdiction may be thought to under-
mine the policies implicit in exclusive federal infringement
jurisdiction, these doctrines help restore the shaking foundations.
Blurring the jurisdictional lines sketched above has several
less fortunate results as well. At a minimum, the awkwardness
and inefficiency entailed by the inevitable mistaken choices re-
sulting from obscure jurisdictional doctrine are encountered. 42
The fact that the mistake leading to dismissal for lack of juris-
diction may be simply one of maladroit pleading exacerbates
this problem More importantly, if it is assumed that there is
any sound reason for continuing to apply state law to the un-
derlying contractual relationships, exercise of the choice to re-
sort to federal infringement jurisdiction means that federal
courts must frequently answer questions of state law without
even the excuse of diversity. Finally, and perhaps most funda-
mentally, the current lines of choice do not correspond to any
41. The election is indeed optional. The fact that suit may be
brought for infringement does not preclude resort to state courts on
a breach of contract theory even though the resulting litigation may
require state court determination of the validity or scope of the patents
involved. E.g., Hold Stitch Fabric Mach. Co. v. May Hosiery Mills,
184 Tenn. 19, 195 S.W.2d 18, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 759 (1946); Shaw v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 Vt. 206, 226 A.2d 903 (1966).
Cf. Nelson v. Mills Music, Inc., 278 App. Div. 311, 104 N.Y.S.2d 605
(1951).
One commentator has asserted that if a licensee repudiates the
license on the ground of patent invalidity, the licensor must resort to
federal infringement jurisdiction. R. ELLis, PATENT LICENSFS § 335 (A.
Deller ed. 1958). This conclusion seems to entail consequences which
cannot be countenanced. The license, for instance, may involve obliga-
tions of the licensee to practice the licensed invention or to allow the
licensor to share the benefits of improvements developed by the licensee
[a nonexclusive license, for instance, should often be valid]. Providing
an adequate substitute for such duties by an infringement decree would
be, to say the least, difficult.
Pan American Petrol. Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U.S. 656 (1961),
provides a closely related example. Exclusive federal jurisdiction of
claims arising under the Natural Gas Act was there held not to pre-
clude alternate resort to state courts on theories of breach of ex-
press contract or restitution. Heavy reliance was placed on analogous
cases involving patent contracts for the conclusion that "if the plain-
tiff decides not to invoke a federal right, his claim belongs in a state
court." 366 U.S. at 663.
42. Compare D. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American
Law Institute: Part 1, 36 U. CHI L. REV. 1 (1968): "Jurisdiction should
be as self-regulated as breathing .... ." Of course this is not to say
that the conflicting considerations often involved in drawing the lines
of federal jurisdiction may always be balanced best by rules so clear
as to be self-applying. The price of some uncertainty may at times be
well repaid by better results.
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intelligible reason for allocating litigation between state and fed-
eral courts. For it is clear that present rules do not yet allow
resort to federal courts by any party affected by a ruling on
the validity or scope 'of a patent. If the policies underlying ex-
clusive federal infringement jurisdiction are as important as
they ought to be to justify exclusivity, rational rules would at
least allow such a choice. If, on the other hand, it is not
thought particularly important to provide such supposedly ex-
pert federal rulings, there is no rhyme nor reason to the basis
on which they are currently made available.43
1. Licensor Claims Against Licensee
The clearest illustration of the optional availability of fed-
eral infringement jurisdiction, and the easiest access to it, oc-
curs in suits brought by a licensor on a claim that a licensee is
practicing the patent beyond the limits permitted by the li-
cense. The Supreme Court has chosen such a case for one of
its frequent pronouncements that "the party who brings a suit
is master to decide what law he will rely upon,' 44 and has al-
lowed extension of infringement jurisdiction even to claims
that a third party is inducing infringement by inducing the li-
censee to transcend the limits imposed by the license terms.'15
Suit for infringement in such circumstances has the added ad-
vantage that the licensor does not have to terminate the license
arrangement as a condition of access to the federal courts.
Matters become murkier when the licensor's claim is that
the licensee has failed to perform some affirmative duty under-
taken in return for the license. Again there is a general prin-
ciple that "the plaintiff is absolute master of what jurisdiction
he will appeal to,"'46 and he may within some uncertain limits
43. See Parts I(C) & III (A) infra.
44. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
See also Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 205 (1874). Goodyear
v. Union India Rubber Co., 10 F. Cas. 726 (No. 5,586) (S.D.N.Y. 1857),
is an early opinion clearly drawing the line between use of the patented
invention beyond the scope of the license giving rise to infringement
jurisdiction and mere failure to perform a license promise not giving
rise to infringement jurisdiction.
45. Geneva Furniture Mfg. Co. v. S. Karpen & Bros., 238 U.S. 254(1915); Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912). Alternative resort
to state courts may be possible on a tort claim of interference with the
license contracts. See Koratron Co. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 418 F.2d
1314 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 909 (1970).
46. Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479, 480 (1915).
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choose to treat the licensee's violation as ground for terminating
the license and treating any further practice of the invention
by the licensee as infringement.47 Unhappily, it was at least an
anticipation of some as yet unestablished judicial clarification
for the Supreme Court to have pronounced that the licensor
in such situations is "absolute master" of the jurisdictional
choice.
One limitation that appears to linger on is that of pleading
form. In the very first Supreme Court decision dealing with the
scope of federal patent jurisdiction in this area, the license in
suit provided that upon failure to make stipulated payments all
rights granted would revert to the licensor. The suit brought
by the licensor set out the license terms, alleged nonpayment,
and prayed for a decree revesting the licensor with all his orig-
inal rights and for an injunction against further use of the li-
censed machine as infringement. The Court ruled that the
suit was not one arising under the patent laws since it primarily
sought to set aside the contract and sought relief against in-
fringement only as a consequence of the preceding contract
relief.48 It has since been decided that if the suit is properly
framed for relief against infringement, federal jurisdiction is
not defeated because the complaint also anticipates and seeks
to avoid a defense based on a license.40  The pleading line be-
47. The clearest recent illustration is Morpul, Inc. v. Crescent
Hosiery Mills, 265 F. Supp. 279, 288, 302-03 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). An in-
teresting variation is illustrated by Radio Corp. of America v. Cable
Tube Corp., 66 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 703
(1934). This principle finds particularly easy application in situations
where the licensor claims that the entire license agreement is vitiated
by its fraudulent procurement by the licensee. E.g., Purer & Co. v.
Aktiebolaget Addo, 410 F.2d 871, 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
834 (1969); Globe Steel Abrasive Co. v. National Metal Abrasive Co.,
101 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1939).
Other illustrations may be found in Bucky v. Sebo, 115 F. Supp.
555, 564 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 208 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1953);
Brooks v. Stolley, 4 F. Cas. 302 (No. 1,962) (D. Ohio 1845). A de-
lightful series showing how a carefully limited statement may be ex-
panded by successive dicta into a supposed absolute freedom of choice is
provided by Scherr v. Difco Labs., 401 F.2d 443, 446 n.4 (6th Cir. 1968),
which relies on Universal Rim Co. v. General Motors Corp., 31 F.2d
969, 970 (6th Cir. 1929), which, in turn, relies on Oscar Bennett Foun-
dry Co. v. Crowe, 219 F. 450 (3d Cir. 1915).
48. Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99 (1850) (the question
arose under provisions for appellate rather than original jurisdiction
over actions arising under the patent laws).
49. Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479, 480 (1915);
Rubens v. Bowers, 136 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1943); Goss v. Henry
McCleary Timber Co., 82 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1936).
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tween state and federal jurisdiction accordingly remains ob-
scure. 50
A more nearly substantive limitation on free access to in-
fringement jurisdiction derives from the underlying assumption
that the licensor is in fact free to treat the license as terminated.
If the license has been drawn to make the duties of the licensee
merely a matter of promise, rather than an express condition
to the continued duration of the license, the only conclusion that
can be drawn with any confidence is that controlling state
contract law sometimes will and sometimes will not allow the
licensor to treat the licensee's breach of promise as grounds for
forfeiting the entire license.51 The currently indicated response
in such situations is that although there is infringement jurisdic-
tion, a conclusion that the license has not been effectively termi-
nated precludes relief.52 As discussed below, however, free use
of pendent jurisdiction might serve to allow disposition of all
issues by the federal court.5 3 Even if the duties of the licensee
are expressly made conditions to the continued existence of the
license, there are dark hints threading through the Supreme
Court's opinions that such conditions may not always be ac-
cepted as a basis for terminating the license, and that if they
are not accepted infringement jurisdiction must fail just as in
cases where simple breach of promise is found an inadequate
basis for terminating the license.54
50. See Smith Separator Corp. v. Dillon, 98 F.2d 521 (10th Cir.
1938) (postdating all of the relevant Supreme Court decisions). Added
obscurity is provided by the assignment cases discussed in Part I (B) (3)
infra.
51. See generally R. ELLIS, PATENT LICENSES ch. 24 at 327-52 (A.
Deller ed. 1958). The earliest clear pronouncement that a mere fail-
ure to pay license royalties does not allow access to infringement juris-
diction is Goodyear v. Union India Rubber Co., 10 F. Cas. 726 (No.
5,586) (S.D.N.Y. 1857).
52. Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 511 (1926). Cf. Geneva
Furniture Mfg. Co. v. S. Karpen & Bros., 238 U.S. 254 (1915); United
Mfg. & Service Co. v. Holwin Corp., 187 F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1951).
An early case in this line is Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U.S. 547 (1878),
where the Court refused to allow the patentee to sue for infringement
after repudiating the license for nonperformance by the licensee. There
is ample room to read the opinion as resting on a still viable ground
that in some circumstances, at least, rescission by unilateral action of
one party to the license is not available. See 99 U.S. at 556. Nonetheless,
it is currently fashionable to suggest that there really was infringementjurisdiction, regardless of the right of the plaintiff to recover, without
considering the possibility that the allegations of the complaint in that
case effectively established that there was no right to rescind. E.g.,
Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 506, 510 (1926).
53. See Part I(B) (4) infra.
54. Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 511 (1926). See Chade-
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Finally, the major practical limitation on electing to treat
the license as terminated and to sue for infringement is that
the licensor may very well prefer to keep the license in force.
Likewise it seems certain that if suit is not brought until the
license has expired and the licensee has ceased to practice the
invention, many forms of breach such as failure to pay stipu-
lated royalties would be subject to remedy only by way of ac-
tion on the contract.
In short, access to infringement remedies by a licensor is
limited by practical considerations, and may very well be lim-
ited further by theoretical restraints on freedom to treat the li-
cense as terminated. These limitations do not appear to bear
any rational relation to the considerations which may be thought
to make it desirable to allow recourse to a federal determina-
tion of the validity or scope of the patent involved in the li-
censing arrangement.55
2. Licensee Claims Against Licensor
One of the established situations of choice between state
and federal infringement jurisdiction is found in the case of an
exclusive licensee who believes that the licensor is practicing
the invention in violation of the promised exclusivity. The Su-
preme Court established the rule long ago that since the licensor
could not be expected to sue himself for infringement, the
exclusive licensee could do so." This rule clearly applies
loid Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 203 F. 993 (7th Cir. 1913); Woodworth
v. Weed, 30 F. Cas. 595 (No. 18,022) (N.D.N.Y. 1846) (enjoining in-
fringement unless the licensee pays royalties notwithstanding license
clause voiding the license for nonpayment).
55. There may be offered one final illustration of the strange lines
currently accepted. Some attention will be focused in an ensuing sec-
tion on the currently accepted premise that there is a valid role for
state law in the enforcement of promises not to infringe a patent.
See Part IE) infra. Since such contracts are governed by state law,
it has followed that suits for breach by infringement are not within
federal infringement jurisdiction. See United Lens Corp. v. Doray Lamp
Co., 93 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1937); Coty, Inc. v. Bourjois, Inc., 109 F. Supp.
431 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). It is difficult indeed to understand why suit may
often be brought for infringement when a licensee has practiced the
invention beyond the limits imposed by the license, but may not be
brought when the theory is that the defendant has broken a promise
not to practice the invention at all. See text accompanying notes 44-45
supra. Presumably the answer would be that infringement jurisdiction
may indeed be 'invoked if the patent owner chooses to rely on his
patent right rather than his contract right. This answer, however,
simply serves to underscore the question whether there is any valid
role whatever for contracts not to infringe.
56. Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 205, 222-23 (1874).
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even though it becomes apparent before the close of the plead-
ings that the only dispute between the parties concerns rights
created by the license contract.57
Access to federal jurisdiction on an infringement theory
appears to be unavailable under current theories if the licensee
does not have an exclusive license.,5  A nonexclusive licensee,
for instance, might believe that the licensor had failed to per-
form a promise to pursue infringers, or that the licensor has
an obligation to hold the licensee harmless against claims of in-
fringement of a patent owned by a third party based on the li-
censee's activities in practicing the licensed patent. Although
actions based on such claims might center almost exclusively on
questions of federal patent law, it would at least take some fancy
pleading footwork to persuade a federal court to assume non-
diversity jurisdiction.5 9
An alternate route successfully traveled by some licensees
to enter federal courts suggests that the cause may not be hope-
less. The clearest situation in which several courts have been
persuaded to accept federal jurisdiction has involved repudia-
tion of the license followed by suit brought by the licensee for
a declaration that its continuing activities do not infringe the
patent and that the patent is invalid.60
57. Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U.S. 282
(1902). Current illustrations include: James C. Wilborn & Sons v.
Brandex Tilt Sash, Inc., 380 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1967); McKnight v. Akins,
192 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1951); Superior Testers, Inc. v. Damco Testers,
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. La. 1970).
58. Under ordinary doctrine, an exclusive licensee may bring suit
for infringement against third parties, joining the licensor against the
licensor's will if need be. See Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio
Corp. of America, 269 U.S. 459 (1926). The general line between assign-
ments and licenses is discussed briefly in Part II(C) infra. It may
be appropriate to note here, however, that an exclusive license may be
granted after a bare license has been granted to someone else; the ex-
clusive licensee in such cases has the same rights to invoke infringe-
ment jurisdiction against third parties as any other exclusive licensee.
E.g., Paul E. Hawkinson Co. v. Carnell, 112 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1940).
59. See Part I(C) infra.
60. Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Inds., 448 F.2d 1328 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3315 (Nos. 71-570, 71-585) (Jan. 10,
1972), aff'g 319 F. Supp. 218 (D. Del. 1970); Ski Pole Specialists, Inc. v.
McDonald, 159 U.S.P.Q. 709 (9th Cir. 1968), vacated, 167 U.S.P.Q. 519
(9th Cir. 1969), on remand, 167 U.S.P.Q. 526 (D. Idaho 1970); Chicago
Metallic Mfg. Co. v. Edward Katzinger Co., 123 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1941)(see 329 U.S. 394 (1947) for later history); Components, Inc. v. Western
Elec. Co., 318 F. Supp. 959 (D. Me. 1970); Lionel Corp. v. De Filippis,
11 F. Supp. 712 (E.D.N.Y. 1935). Cf. Universal Time Punch, Inc. v.
Consolidated Datametrics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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Suits for declaratory judgment brought before either licen-
sor or licensee has attempted to repudiate the license, however,
have generally been dismissed for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction. The basic reason appears to be that if the license is
still in effect, the licensor is not in a position to sue for patent
infringement and may sue only in state court for breach of li-
cense if the licensee fails to pay royalties. The attempt by the
licensee to assert claims of patent invalidity or noncoverage,
then, represents an attempt to assert a federal defense to a state-
created cause of action for- contract relief; the decision in
Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co.61 is thought to bar
this avenue into federal jurisdiction -.0 2 It follows that if the li-
censor is in a position to sue for infringement, the licensee may
maintain the declaratory judgment action. Two courts have in-
deed so ruled in cases where the licensor has asserted that there
is no license63 or has charged the licensee with infringement.
0 4
Perhaps it would be more accurate to characterize these de-
cisions as allowing access to federal jurisdiction through a declar-
atory judgment action where the defendant is asserting a posi-
tion which, if valid, could be enforced by suit in the federal ju-
risdiction, since there is no indication that the existence of ju-
risdiction would ultimately turn on the correctness of the de-
fendant's assertions.
At least two other opinions appear to go further. In one,
without discussion, a company licensed to practice several pat-
ents was allowed to maintain a declaratory judgment action
based on claims of the -invalidity of one patent, and its non-
applicability to the plaintiff's products. 5 Where several pat-
ents are involved in the license, there are obviously strong rea-
sons to avoid a requirement that the licensee repudiate the en-
tire agreement in order to be able to challenge a single patent.
61. 344 U.S. 237, 248-49 (1952).
62. Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Inds., 448 F.2d 1328 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3315 (Nos. 71-570, 71-585) (Jan. 10,
1972), aff'g 313 F. Supp. 253 (D. Del. 1970); W. P. Grace & Co. v.
Union Carbide Corp., 319 F. Supp. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See Product
Engr'g & Mg. Co. v. Barnes, 424 F.2d 42, 45 (10th Cir. 1970). Cf.
Tuthill v. Wilsey, 182 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1950).
A recent exposition of similar doctrine in another substantive area
is Chandler v. O'Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045, 1055-56 (10th Cir. 1971). See
generally C. WEiGHT, FEsnmu.L COURTS 61-62 (2d ed. 1970).
63. General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 326 F.2d 926 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964).
64. Grip Nut Co. v. Sharp, 124 F.2d 814 (7th Cir. 1941).
65. Beckman Instruments Inc. v. Technical Development Corp.,
433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971).
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In a more recent decision, moreover, a licensee has been al-
lowed to maintain a declaratory judgment action as to the
validity and coverage of both of the patents involved in the li-
cense agreement without repudiating it. The court simply con-
cluded that no useful purpose would be served by requiring
termination prior to suit. 6
At first blush, the assumed desirability of allowing ac-
cess to a federal adjudication of patent validity and coverage
would suggest that allowing suit without regard to repudiation
is desirable. The only countervailing consideration is that of
fair dealing between the parties: allowing such a suit would
enable a company to take a license for protection, fully intend-
ing to challenge the patent involved, and then bring suit from
a position of having its license and eating it too. Reflecting this
concern, the Scott Amendments to the pending patent reform
bill would require that a licensee renounce any protection of
the license as a condition of the right to contest the validity of
the licensed patent.6 7  A more restricted version might be to
allow the licensor the option to terminate the license if the
licensee challenges the validity of the patent.08  Whatever
comes of these proposals, there seems little reason to conclude
that the added attractiveness of suit in a federal forum will so
increase the proclivity of licensees to contest patent validity
that federal declaratory relief should be denied. 9 Once this
66. Medtronic, Inc. v. American Optical Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1327
(D. Minn. 1971). The matched pair of district court decisions in the
Thiokol case were distinguished on the ground that they involved
products being produced at the time the license was given, while
new products were involved in the present case. See notes 60 & 62
supra. The court added, however, that it believed federal patent policy
requires that licensees be allowed easy challenge of the patents in their
licenses without the risk of ending the license.
67. S. 643, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971), Amendment No. 24. See 117
CONG. RFc. S. 3400-01 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1971).
68. E.g., 518 B.N.A. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. A-2 (June 15,
1971) (suggestions of former Ass't Atty. General Richard W. McLaren).
69. Since state law might very well allow the licensor to repudiate
if the licensee discontinued performing the license obligations, such as
payment of royalties, pending the declaratory judgment suit, the licensee
will ordinarily be saddled with both the highly expensive chore of
patent litigation and also the cost of performing its license obligations
pending suit. Although it may be entirely appropriate to assume that
even this situation allows the licensee an unfair advantage over the
licensor, the real basis of objection seems to lie in a desire to increase
the risks of litigation as compared to licensing so that there is less
danger that any court will ever pass on the patent's validity. The
supposed desirability of fostering judicial review of patents reflected in
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), and the preference that the
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concern is put aside there is no sound reason why the ques-
tionable dictum in the Wycoff decision should be honored to
preclude resort to federal court.7 0 At least in an area where
federal courts supposedly have so much to offer that infringe-
ment jurisdiction is made exclusive, concern about transferring
license litigation from the state courts is simply misplaced.
Allowing a licensee access to federal court whenever a claim
of invalidity or noncoverage of the patent is raised would mean
that licensees have broader avenues of access than are currently
available to licensors. Discrimination in access to federal tri-
bunals does not offer any reason for rejecting jurisdiction when
it is possible and it seems desirable to accept jurisdiction. On
the contrary, fullest means should be utilized to make such use
of jurisdiction as is available under current statutory and de-
cisional rules while attention is devoted to further statutory or
decisional development to eliminate discrimination resulting
from denial of jurisdiction in comparable circumstances."
Licensee suits for declaratory judgment are apt to involve
a delicate question of deference when the federal suit is simply
a reaction to a suit brought by the licensor in a state court.
review be in the federal courts, together outweigh the argument that
allowing licensee access to declaratory judgment during the life of the
license is simply unfair until Congress determines otherwise. Slight
added support for this view may be found in the further Lear ruling
that the license agreement may not validly impose an obligation to pay
royalties until the moment when the patent is held invalid. The rea-
son was that payment of the double costs of royalties and litigation
might deter licensees from challenging patent validity. 395 U.S. at
673-74. See also Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 334 F. Supp.
1269 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), which requires refund of royalties paid by the
licensee during the period prior to any challenge to the patent.
70. It is generally agreed that federal question jurisdiction should
be available on the basis of a declaratory judgment action which demon-
strates the existence of a genuine federal question. E.g., AL, STUDY
OF THE DIVISION OF JURIsDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CounTs
§ 1311(a) at 170-72, 176 (1968); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 61-62 (2d
ed. 1970); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Insti-
tute: Part II, 36 U. CI. L. REv. 268, 271 (1969). At least one federal
court has even accepted jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment action
brought to determine a federal question defense interposed in a pending
state action. The court ruled that proceedings should be stayed and
revived if the state court should refuse to entertain the claimed federal
defense. Shareholders Management Co. v. Gregory, 449 F.2d 326 (9th
Cir. 1971).
Although none of the decisions in the area under discussion cite it,
much of the current difficulty springs from statements in the opinion
in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1950).
See generally Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the Federal Courts,
53 COLUML L. REv. 157, 177-84 (1953); IL Trautman, Federal Right
Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 VAND. L. Rsv. 445 (1955).
71. See Part I(C) infra.
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Ideally state courts may voluntarily defer consideration of pat-
ent questions to the federal court, allowing an indirect removal
of that part of the pending state litigation.7 2 Where there is
no indication of such cooperation from the state courts, some
federal courts have deferred to the state litigation7 8 while others
have pushed ahead.7 4 Deference to the state courts seems pref-
erable if they are not willing to concur in the judgment that it
would be better to determine the patent questions in the federal
court. The general jurisdictional lines developed over the years
have made it clear that the Supreme Court has not placed a
high value on keeping patent questions in federal courts and
simultaneous consideration of the same issues in two courts
is in all events an egregious waste of scarce judicial resources.75
Denial of federal jurisdiction declaratory relief to a licen-
see who is unwilling to repudiate, without more, would appar-
ently return the jurisdictional question to the definition of the
circumstances in which the licensor might invoke infringement
jurisdiction against the licensee. Even this approach might al-
low licensees broader access than licensors to federal juris-
diction, if they were allowed to invoke declaratory remedies
whenever the licensor is asserting a position which might be
72. See Adkins v. United States Dist. Court, 431 F.2d 859 (9th
Cir. 1970); Talbot v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 967 (3d Cir.
1939); Comment, Jurisdiction-State Courts-Suit for Unfair Competi-
tion Where Issue of Validity of Patent Involved is Pending in Federal
Court, 50 HARv. L. REV. 364 (1936).
73. Product Engr'g & Mfg., Inc. v. Barnes, 424 F.2d 42 (7th Cir.
1970); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1964); H.J.
Heinz Co. v. Owens, 189 F.2d 505, rehearing denied, 191 F.2d 257 (9th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 905 (1952).
74. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co. v. Edward Katzinger Co., 123 F.2d
518, 520 (7th Cir. 1941); Lionel Corp. v. De Filippis, 11 F. Supp. 712,
716 (E.D.N.Y. 1935). In Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Inds., 448
F.2d 1328, 1332 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3315 (Nos.
71-570, 71-585) (Jan. 10, 1972), the court ruled that it would be im-
proper for the federal court to proceed with trial of a declaratory judg-
ment action commenced after a state court suit on the license agree-
ment, "unless and until it shall . . . be found . . . that the state court
is willing to hold the matter before it in abeyance ......
75. The possible alternative of enjoining the state litigation rests
on far too flimsy grounds to be reconciled with the restrictions imposed
by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). The broad overlap long recognized between
state and federal power to determine patent questions precludes any
claim that an injunction of the state proceedings is necessary in aid of
the federal jurisdiction. See Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Inds.,
448 F.2d 1328, 1331-32 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3315
(Nos. 71-570, 71-585) (Jan. 10, 1972). But compare Chisum, The Allo-
cation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in Patent
Litigation, 46 WAsi-I. L. REv. 633 (1971).
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capable of presentation as a question in the federal infringement
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, there would almost certainly remain
circumstances in which patent issues could not be taken to fed-
eral court by a licensee desirous of litigating them there. 70
To whatever extent this result remains, it is as inappropriate
as in the other situations already examined.
3. Assignment and Ownership Claims
Assignments, as licenses, are basically contracts largely
governed by state law; jurisdiction over actions to enforce or set
aside an assignment is thus basically state jurisdiction.77  As
with licenses, it is of course possible that the assignment may
be terminated, remitting the parties to their original rights
under patent law, including access to infringement jurisdiction
to enforce those rights.78 Several cases, however, suggest that
it is more difficult to obtain federal infringement jurisdiction
when the dispute involves claims of a right to enforce an as-
signment and to concurrently enforce the patent rights spring-
ing from the assignment. Jurisdiction has frequently been re-
fused when an attempt is made to secure a compelled assign-
ment7 9 or a declaration of ownership 0 together with relief
against infringement. The basic rationale appears to be that
proper pleading of a claim for infringement requires pleading
title to the patent, and that unlike license situations where title
has remained in the licensor throughout, the complaint in such
cases shows that it is necessary to obtain judicial relief award-
ing or setting aside the assignment before a claim for infringe-
76. This result could be avoided by recognizing still another route
into federal jurisdiction, allowing combination of a request for declara-
tory relief with the broad approach to the proper pleading of a federal
question reflected in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255
U.S. 180 (1921). See JFD Electronics Corp. v. Channel Master Corp.,
229 F. Supp. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), and Part I(C) infra.
77. See text accompanying notes 22-29 supra. See also, e.g., Chi-
cago Fittings Corp. v. Howe, 309 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ii. 1970); Aloe
Creme Labs. v. Farkas, 145 U.S.P.Q. 649 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
78. E.g., Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 437 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1971).
79. E.g., Cincinnati Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Vigorith, 212 F.2d 583 (6th
Cir. 1954); Measurements Corp. v. Ferris Instr. Corp., 159 F.2d 590
(3d Cir. 1947); Lion Mfg. Corp. v. Chicago Flexible Shaft Co., 106 F.2d
930 (7th Cir. 1939).
80. Laning v. National Ribbon & Carbon Paper Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d
565 (7th Cir. 1942). A scholarly discussion of a closely related prob-
lem in the cognate copyright field is provided by Judge Friendly's
opinion in T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
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ment is available.8' Since such relief is not founded on the
patent laws, there is no federal jurisdiction.
This approach to assignment situations represents a reali-
zation of the threats lingering in some of the license decisions
that perhaps nonjudicial termination of the license may not al-
ways be recognized as a basis for asserting infringement claims.8 '
Adroit pleading will accordingly be much less successful in in-
voking infringement jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it seems almost
certain that, as with licenses, there will occur situations in
which a party to an assignment relationship may be able to de-
termine jurisdiction by the adeptness of his pleading.83
Claims of ownership of a patented invention based on some
ground other than assignment have encountered similar diffi-
culty in avoiding the basic rule of exclusive state jurisdiction.
The typical suit involves a claim that an invention was misap-
propriated by the patentee, who wrongfully procured the pat-
ent on another's invention. Federal jurisdiction has been re-
fused both where the request for relief has included an
assignment of the patent 4 and where it has been limited
to a declaration of the patent's invalidity.8 5 Likewise, juris-
diction has been refused where the plaintiff was the patentee
seeking to establish the validity of the patent over claims that
the defendant was the real inventor.80 There is no reason at all
why federal jurisdiction should not be available, as at least one
court has recognized.8 7
81. Dill Mfg. Co. v. Goff, 125 F.2d 676, 677-78 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 672 (1942).
82. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
83. See Lang v. Patent Tile Co., 216 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1954),
where the plaintiff brought suit for interpretation of the instrument
claimed to be an assignment of the patent together with relief against
infringement. Jurisdiction was denied on the ground that the primary
and controlling purpose of the complaint was to secure an interpreta-
tion of the assignment. It seems highly likely that if suit had been
brought simply for infringement, the plaintiff could have secured the
desired relief.
84. Eckert v. Braun, 155 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1946).
85. Howard v. Archer, 115 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1940); Sachs v. Cluett,
Peabody & Co., 91 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
86. Muskegon Piston Ring Co. v. Olsen, 307 F.2d 85 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 952 (1963). Although the result seems
clearly wrong in terms of the existence of federal jurisdiction, it may
be right on the unspoken ground that the courts should not interfere
where the same dispute is pending in Patent Office interference pro-
ceedings. Compare Grob v. Continental Mach. Specialties, Inc., 204
Minn. 459, 283 N.W. 774 (1939).
87. See Cummings v. Moore, 202 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1953) (ac-
cepting jurisdiction). Cf. North Branch Prods., Inc. v. Fisher, 284 F.2d
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As with the areas previously examined, the jurisdictional
lines suggested by this brief statement are susceptible of fur-
ther blurring. Infringement jurisdiction has recently been held
available where the plaintiff's right to an assignment depended
on whether the invention made by the defendant was an
"improvement ' on the invention licensed to the defendant-a
question which the court took to be one of patent law.88 Since
agreements to assign future inventions are often construed to
require assignment only of patentable inventions,8 9 this ap-
proach could bring several new cases into federal jurisdiction."
This approach also suggests a willingness to determine federal
jurisdiction on the probability that a federal patent law ques-
tion is actually involved in the suit; applied generally, it could
be expanded to erase present jurisdictional lines almost com-
pletely.91
Finally, such blurred lines as remain are no more intelligi-
ble as a means of allocating jurisdiction than the other lines
already sketched. At a minimum, the need to resort to state
courts for determinations of patent ownership may require two
lawsuits to vindicate the patent right. Worse, at least in the
eyes of those who find important implications in the policy
of federal exclusivity, state courts are apt to respond to the yen
for efficiency by adding injunctive relief against future in-
fringement.92 And in any event, there will remain a wide va-
riety of circumstances in which federal jurisdiction cannot be
invoked even though controlling issues of patent scope or valid-
ity are involved9
611 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 827 (1961) (accepting suit
for declaration of patent ownership not as one arising under the
patent laws, but as resting in the "common-law equity jurisdiction" of
the District Court for the District of Columbia).
88. Imperial Appliance Corp. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 185
(7th Cir. 1970).
89. E.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Worcester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205
(1st Cir. 1971); Republic Engr'g & Mfg. Co. v. Moskovitz, 376 S.W.2d
649 (Mo. App.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 837 (1964). Of course such agree-
ments are often construed to cover both patentable and nonpatentable
inventions, in part because of the difficulty of distinguishing one from
the other. E.g., Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329
(D. Conn. 1952).
90. A particularly obscure opinion suggesting similar develop-
ments is found in Papazian v. American Steel & Wire Co., 155 F. Supp.
111, 117 (NJ). Ohio 1957).
91. See Part I(C) infra.
92. See note 36 supra.
93. Claims by the assignee against the assignor will aften lie only
in state jurisdiction, barring a further expansion of present views. For
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4. Pendent Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional distinctions could easily be blurred further
still by resourceful use of pendent jurisdiction doctrinesf 4 Ear-
lier decisions were quite niggardly about allowing joinder of li-
cense or assignment claims to infringement claims 6  More re-
cently, as might be expected, a considerably more liberal ap-
proach has been taken to allow pendent joinder of such claimsY"
Nonetheless, there is no clear indication that federal courts are
yet prepared to recognize such logical extensions as allowing
pendent determination of a state law claim to enforce an as-
signment as a precondition to granting infringment relief, or
instance, a fully paid assignment might include an express warranty of
validity; suit for its breach would hardly be susceptible to framing as
an infringement claim.
It might be added that there are several other situations in which
patent questions may be laced into an exclusive state jurisdiction. See,
e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODs § 2-312(3), providing implied war-
ranties against infringement.
94. See generally United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715 (1966).
95. E.g., Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations, Inc., 189 F.2d 546 (2d
Cir. 1951) (refusing to consider license claim in infringement suit);
Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 822 (1949) (may not consider claim for
royalties due before license termination in suit for infringement follow-
ing termination); Goss v. Henry McCleary Timber Co., 82 F.2d 476,
479-80 (9th Cir. 1936) (if license defense to infringement suit is sus-
tained, plaintiff may not be granted recovery on the license); Ellis-
Foster Co. v. Synthetic Plastics Co., 8 F. Supp. 215 (D. Del. 1934)
(license may not be reformed in suit by licensor for infringement).
The Second Circuit has clearly indicated that it is no longer attached to
the restrictive views of pendent jurisdiction exemplified by the Klein-
man decision. See Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d
538, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1956).
96. E.g., Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 437 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1971) (as-
signment claims may be joined with infringement claims in suit by
assignor after assignee terminated the assignment); Pursche v. Atlas
Scraper & Engr'g Co., 300 F.2d 467, 482-85 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 911 (1962) (claims for misuse of confidential information
after termination of license are claims of "unfair competition" within
scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1970) ); McKnight v. Akins, 192 F.2d 674
(6th Cir. 1951); Research Frontiers Inc. v. Marks Polarized Corp.,
290 F. Supp. 725, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Consolidated Vacuum Corp. v.
Machine Dynamics, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 70 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Finnerty v.
Wallen, 77 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Cal. 1948). Cf. Dynamic Instrument
Corp. v. Fedtro, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). None of these
cases involves assertion of pendent jurisdiction to give relief under
state law for the very same conduct complained of as infringement.
The statutory provision for asserting pendent jurisdiction in
patent cases refers only to claims "of unfair competition." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(b) (1970). As may be suggested by the Pursche case, supra,
it accordingly is not likely to be of much use in the present context.
[Vol. 56:313
PATENTS AND STATE LAW
allowing pendent enforcement of license rights after a licensee
has successfully defended an infringement suit on the ground
that there was a valid subsisting license2 7
Even if the logical steps are taken to extend pendent juris-
diction, they will not provide a method of ensured access to
federal jurisdiction. Presumably there will remain cases
which simply cannot be warped into a plausible allegation of
infringement plus a contract or other pendent claim; a licensor
wishing to recover royalties and to maintain the license, for in-
stance, would hardly be able to make use of pendent jurisdic-
tion. If a federal determination of patent questions is to be avail-
able to any party wishing it, some other line of development
must be followed.
C. EXPANDING THE JURISDICTIONAL FRONTIERS
98
1. Decisional Development
The picture just painted presents a map of jurisdictional
demarcations which correspond to no unifying principle. The
more recent decisions canvassed above do suggest that federal
courts are groping toward means of extending federal juris-
diction, presumably because of a strengthened belief that there
are important public interests to be served by guarding against
improvident extension of patent rights by inexpert state tri-
bunals. If there is no such solid reason to prefer federal
adjudication of patent issues, these decisions and their ancestors
are left with no support beyond unsatisfyingly formal distinc-
tions of pleading. But if there is good reason to prefer fed-
eral adjudication of patent issues, the decisions have yet to pro-
vide any reliable means of ensuring that federal adjudication is
available to any party wishing it.
97. The one clear, precise illustration is Brooks v. Stolley, 4 F. Cas.
302, 305 (Nos. 1,962, 1,963) (D. Ohio 1845, 1846). The court there ruled
that in a suit brought by a licensor for infringement following failure of
the licensee to pay royalties, it could consider the license claim on a
theory which is clearly a theory of pendent jurisdiction; since there is
infringement jurisdiction, "the court may decide other matters between
the parties, which of themselves, might not afford ground for the origi-
nal exercise of jurisdiction" Id. at 305. The ultimate disposition of
the case was dismissal of the infringement claim with an order that
the defendant pay accrued royalties.
98. A recent competent exposition of the possibilities of further
expanding the scope of federal jurisdiction makes it possible to shorten
this section. See Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State
and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WAsm L. Rlv. 633, 664-70
(1971).
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On balance, the preference for federal determination of pat-
ent issues is well founded 9 Adjustment of jurisdictional lines
to reflect perceived changes in the needs of the day is thus ap-
propriate.10 0 How far courts should attempt to forward this
task, and how much of it it should be remitted to legislative de-
cision, is nonetheless a difficult problem. The ideal resolution
of present tensions goes far beyond simple adjustments of ad-
judicating competence. The best solution lies in federalizing the
law of patent agreements and of any unfair competition theories
involving patents which should not be discarded. Access to fed-
eral jurisdiction would be correspondingly broad, although un-
der present statutes it would probably be necessary to satisfy
the jurisdictional amount requirement of the general federal
question jurisdiction. 10 1 The grounds for preferring this solu-
tion, however, are sufficiently debatable that the solution is one
which the courts should not attempt without affirmative Con-
gressional guidance.
If courts should continue to recognize the dominion of state
law over patent agreements, expansion of federal jurisdiction
will entail the always undesirable consequence of separating
legislative from judicial authority. 0 2 The very reasons which
99. See Part III (B) infra.
100. Compare Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between
United States and State Courts, 13 CORN. L.Q. 499, 503, 506 (1928):
A division of judicial labor among different courts, particularly
between a dual system of federal and state courts, is especially
subject to the shifting needs of time and circumstance. That
the wisdom of 1875 is the wisdom for today is most unlike-
ly .... We are here in the domain of admimstrative effective-
ness and procedural adaptations-matters not of principle but
of wise expediency.
101. The patent jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970),
confers jurisdiction over actions arising "under any Act of Congress
relating to patents." It would be far more difficult to read this phrase
to encompass actions governed by a federal common law of patent
agreements than it would be to assert jurisdiction over federal com-
mon law claims under the general provision for jurisdiction of civil
actions arising under the "laws . . . of the United States," 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (1970). See generally Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1968); ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION
OF JURISDICTION BETwEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 178 (1968).
It would be possible to determine that § 1338 applied, of course.
The basic line of reasoning would be that the judicial decision to
create a federal common law of patent agreements rests on the needs of
the patent system created by statute; actions arising under the com-
mon law thus derived would accordingly arise from the Patent Code as
an ultimate source. Not only does this approach seem a rather strong-
armed interpretation of the statute, but it also entails the result that
federal jurisdiction would be exclusive.
102. The clearest brief statement has been proviled with refer-
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militate against continued state control, however, minimize the
importance of this loss. In brief, no state has a well developed
body of patent agreements law distinct from general contract
doctrines; there is little reason to fear any significant intrusion
on state interests when federal courts attempt to resolve specific
disputes. Nor is there any great danger of interfering with
primary private planning of patent contracts-such contracts are
significantly removed from the generality of commercial trans-
actions. Both the underdevelopment of state law and the multi-
state nature of many patent transactions suggest the improb-
ability of reliance on specific state law; where there is signifi-
cant reliance on specific state law, it seems likely that the fed-
eral courts will be able to apply it well enough.
Once it is decided to expand federal jurisdiction, ample
means are at hand to accomplish most of the task. The most
obvious means lies in application of the doctrine attributed to
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Company,103 allowing invo-
cation of federal question jurisdiction over a state-created claim
when proper pleading of the claim shows that resolution of a
federal question is necessary to its determination. Language
contemplating this result may be found in various patent deci-
sions,' 04 and a few decisions have squarely adopted this theory
ence to federal diversity jurisdiction, noting that
withdrawal of these cases from state judicial processes in-
volves ... a patent violation of the principle so strongly
urged originally to justify the federal judicial power: thejudicial authority must be coextensive with the legislative.
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAw & CONTEAW. PROB. 216, 235 (1948).
103. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
104. The clearest illustration is Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1,
16 (1912), where it was stated:
The test of jurisdiction is this: Does the complainant "set up
some right, title or interest under the patent laws of the United
States, or make it appear that some right or privilege will be
defeated by one construction, or sustained by another, of those
laws"?
An even more precise formulation is provided by the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Bradley in Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U.S. 547, 556 (1878).
Of course it was in a case affecting patent questions that Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes-a dissenter in Smith-announced his more limiting test
that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action."
American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260
(1916). An apt appraisal of the present possibilities of these lines of
authority in a copyright context, involving the very same statute as
the patent statute, is found in T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965). See ALI, STuvY oF TH
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 178-79
(1968).
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to support federal jurisdiction over state-created claims of un-
fair competition. 10 5 One court, without recognizing the con-
ceptual problems, has even allowed federal jurisdiction over a
suit to collect royalties on a license agreement by reasoning
that the suit must inevitably involve determination of the
scope of the licensed patent.1° 6 It seems likely, however, that
few courts would be willing to push this far in situations where
there is no indication that the party asserting the state-created
claim has justification in the actual pre-litigation dispute for as-
serting the need to determine patent questions.'
0 7
However far the Smith theory may be taken, moreover, it
directly aids only the party wishing to assert an affirmative
claim for relief. The party who wishes federal determination of
defenses involving questions of patent law against a state-
created claim is left with the need to invoke declaratory judg-
ment remedies with such help as the general Smith approach
may lend in urging the appropriateness of allowing declaratory
anticipation of a state court suit. 0 8 As already noted, general
acceptance of this method of invoking federal jurisdiction does
not seem to justify enjoining state court proceedings instituted
before the federal suit was commenced. 0 9 Nor does it seem
likely that this problem could be avoided by allowing the state-
court defendant to remove on the ground that there is original
105. See Ostow & Jacobs, Inc. v. Morgan-Jones, Inc., 180 F. Supp.
38 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), rehearing denied, 189 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Judge Dimock's approach was followed in I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel
Corp., 201 F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (alternate ground), and JFD
Electronics Corp. v. Channel Master Corp., 229 F. Supp. 514 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). The JFD decision is criticized in Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Bur-
lington Ind., 313 F. Supp. 253, 257 (D. Del. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1328
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3315 (Nos. 71-570, 71-585) (Jan.
10, 1972).
106. International Harvester Co. v. Long Mfg. Co., 235 F. Supp. 223
(E.D.N.C. 1964). Cf. Imperial Appliance Corp. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co.,
430 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1970). See also text accompanying note 88 supra.
Imperial Appliance relied on similar notions to uphold infringement
jurisdiction where the complaint shows that resolution of an underly-
ing assignment dispute will turn on questions of patent law.
107. Royalty suits, for instance, could easily involve disputes as to
the basis for payment, the output of the licensee if that happened to be
the method for calculating payment, claims of prior payment, and so on
and on. Unless the licensee has affirmatively explained the basis for his
refusal to pay all the licensor demands, there is apt to be no satis-
factory basis for determining whether patent law questions will be
raised. Examples could be multiplied throughout the range of patent
agreements, but this illustration should suffice.
108. See Part I(B) (2) supra.
109. See note 75 supra.
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federal jurisdiction over all suits on patent agreements. So long
as state law controls such agreements, it would be simply bi-
zarre to cast aside the long standing notion that a plaintiff may
choose whether to found his claim on federal law 10 and to con-
vert the Smith doctrine from an optional route into federal ju-
risdiction into a mandatory ruling that this class of state-created
claims inevitably arises under federal law.
Ingenuity, coupled with some disingenuousness, might
find means to overcome the apparent limitations on available
theory and provide access to federal determination of patent law
issues whenever any party to a litigation desires it.'11 It
seems more likely, however, that decisional developments alone
will not complete the task.
2. Legislative Development
It has already been suggested that Congress should pro-
vide for a federal law of patent agreements and of any still vi-
able unfair competition doctrines involving patents. A statute
conferring federal jurisdiction and explicitly authorizing the
development of federal decisional law could be simply drafted
and ample to the task.112  Jurisdiction could safely be made
concurrent with state courts since either party could take the
case to federal court if desired, and since both parties might be
content with state adjudication for reasons of convenience.
If state law should continue to control the underlying con-
tract and tort principles, the desire to provide federal determina-
tion of patent law claims could be met easily by a statute
allowing removal to federal court by either party to any suit
in which questions controlled by federal patent law are raised. '13
110. The principles are restated in Pan American Petrol. Corp. v.
Superior Court, 366 U.S. 656 (1961).
111. See Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. Rrv. 633, 664-70 (1971).
112. The model would be Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), supplemented by a clear direc-
tion to develop controlling principles of federal common law.
113. The proposed revision of the Judicial Code drafted by the
American Law Institute, and embodied in S. 1876 § 1312(a) (2), 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), provides for removal of state court cases to
federal court by either plaintiff or defendant when a substantial defense
arising under federal law is "properly asserted that, if sustained, would
be dispositive of the action or of all counterclaims therein." It is not
clear whether this language would cover all questions of patent law
which might be raised in litigation on a patent contract. Initially, it
would need to be established that such defenses as an assertion that a
licensed patent is invalid or does not cover the licensee's production
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It might even be possible to provide for referral of the state
law matters back to the state court,114 although the price of
complication seems too high to pay for the gain of state rulings
on questions of state law. The possible alternative of author-
izing a "protective" jurisdiction for all litigation involving pat-
ent agreements or claims of unfair competition involving patents
on the chance that patent law questions might be involved
would entail an unnecessary separation of legislative and judi-
cial authority and should not be adopted. 11
II. APPLICATION OF STATE LAW
TO PATENT TRANSACTIONS
A. ORIGINS OF STATE AUTHORITY
State law today clearly controls many incidents of patents.
Ownership, agreements between co-owners, assignments, li-
censes, agreements not to infringe, and some torts involving
patent rights are all, in varying degrees, subject to state law.
"arise under" federal law rather than under the state contract law. Be-
yond that point, there might be cases in which disposition of the patent
law question in favor of the defendant would not be "dispositive of
the action," particularly where the agreement combines patent rights
and trade secret rights protected by state law. Cf. ALI, STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 197-98
(1968). Finally, the statute requires that the amount in controversy
exceed $10,000; it does not seem likely that the level of the public
interest in federal disposition of patent questions can be accurately
measured by the amount in dispute in a particular private contract suit.
A much more restricted removal proposal was suggested by former
Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren, limiting removal to
situations in which a "licensee" asserts a claim of patent invalidity.
See 518 B.N.A. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., at A-3 (June 15, 1971).
114. Although some care would need to be taken to avoid limiting
the role of the federal court so far as to raise questions whether it
was determining a "case" or "controversy," the acceptance of reference
of state law questions to state courts in diversity litigation suggests
strongly that some constitutional arrangement could be found. See H.
M. HART, JR., & H. WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS 757 (1953). Cf. C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 203-05 (2d ed. 1970); Mattis, Certification of
Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of Federal
Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 717 (1969).
115. General discussions of the problems of "protective jurisdic-
tion" may be found in C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 20 (2d ed. 1970);
H. M. HART, JR. & H. WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS 744-47 (1953); Mishkin,
The "Federal Question" in the Federal Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157,
184-96 (1953); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the
Judicial Code, 13 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 224-25 (1948); Note, Federal
Jurisdiction-Protective Jurisdiction and Adoption as Alternative Tech-
niques for Conferring Jurisdiction on Federal Courts in Consumer
Class Actions, 69 MrcH. L. REV. 710 (1971).
[Vol. 56:313
PATENTS AND STATE LAW
This allocation of authority historically rests in large measure
on the decisions drawing the basic jurisdictional lines painted
above. To the very limited extent that current thought has
been focused on the division of authority, it draws upon the
same reasons as the historic jurisdictional decisions. Statement
of the current state of matters may thus be mingled with a re-
statement of the history already explored from the jurisdictional
perspective in which it was originally cast.
1. General Authority of State Law
Federal patent law is commonly thought not to give even the
right to practice an inventor's discovery. Instead, it defines a
negative-but potentially very valuable-right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling an invention which was pre-
viously the property of the inventor by virtue of state law.11 0
Once the patent issues, moreover, it has been assumed that the
patent itself is endowed with the characteristics of personal
property 17 and-like land conveyed by the federal govern-
ment under a "patent" to a private party-becomes subject
to state law as the primary original source of protection of
property rights.11 8 As with other property, consensual and
tortious transactions are to be governed by state law since
there is no extensive federal statutory regulation of such mat-
116. E.g., Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works,
261 U.S. 24, 36 (1923), where the court stated that "[t]he Government
is not granting the common law right to make, use and vend, but it is
granting the incident of exclusive ownership of that common law
right, which can not be enjoyed save with the common law right"
See also 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
Likewise in Becher v. Contoure Labs., Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391
(1929), the Court approved granting collateral estoppel effect in fed-
eral infringement litigation to a state court determination that the
patentee had wrongfully appropriated the invention, stating that the
inventor's right
was independent of and prior to any arising out of the patent
law, and it seems a strange suggestion that the assertion of
that right can be removed from the cognizance of the tribunals
established to protect it by its opponent going into the patent
office for a later title.
117. This proposition is now embodied in statutory form. See
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970), which provides that "[s]ubject to the provisions
of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property."
118. The analogy to land granted by the federal government was
squarely adopted in denying jurisdiction in Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U.S.
547, 549 (1878). Similarly, it was commonly reasoned that once
goods covered by a patent had been sold, they passed out from the
patent monopoly and became subject to general state law for protection
and enforcement of contractual rights. E.g., Hill v. Whitcomb, 12 F. Cas.
182 (No. 6,502) (D. Mass. 1874).
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ters.119 There is no reason to doubt that when the federal
courts determined for reasons like those just summarized that
cases concerning ownership, licenses, assignments, or disparage-
ment involving patent rights did not arise under federal patent
laws for purposes of federal jurisdiction, they meant the con-
clusion that state law was controlling.120 Three major lines of
reasoning may be added to support the natural implication of
these jurisdictional rulings.
First, and most positively, there are a number of decisions
in which the Supreme Court refused to review state court de-
cisions involving transactions affecting patents.1 2 1 The ground
of decision in each case was that no question of federal law was
presented by the state ruling. Since it is clear that the Su-
preme Court did pay careful attention to the sources of con-
trolling law in determining whether it had power to review
state decisions, 1 22 these cases demonstrate clear attention to the
question of controlling law and a clear determination that state
law-not federal-applied to the matters under attempted re-
view.
119. Cases denying federal jurisdiction quite frequently made much
of the fact that there was no general statutory provision for patent
licenses. E.g., Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99, 101-02 (1850).
See also Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613, 618 (1882). It may be noted
that if a statutory foundation for federal decisional law had been de-
sired, it would have been easy to find. Rights against infringers have
been created as rights against those who "without authority" do the
prohibited acts. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1970). The very first Patent
Act, indeed, provided an infringement remedy against anyone practicing
the patented invention "without the consent of the patentee . . . first
had and obtained in writing." Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat.
109, 111. No great ingenuity would have been required to treat this
provision as explicit foundation for patent licensing and for a federal
law regulating the licensing practices thus authorized.
120. A concise statement is provided by Justice Traynor's opinion in
Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732,
737-38 (1957).
121. Wade v. Lawder, 165 U.S. 624 (1897) (dismissing writ of error
to state court decision refusing to rescind assignment of patent on
claims of fraud and misrepresentation); Marsh v. Nichols, Shepard &
Co., 140 U.S. 344 (1891) (dismissing writ of error to state decision
specifically enforcing patentee's agreement releasing another from any
claims arising from any use of the patented invention at any time);
Felix v. Scharnweber, 125 U.S. 54 (1888) (dismissing writ of error to
state decision enforcing agreement regulating rights of co-owners of
patent); Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46 (1888) (court has no
jurisdiction on writ of error to review state determination that licensee
is estopped to challenge validity of patent).
122. See Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Con-
stitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1035 n.67 (1967).
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Second, although more ambiguously, there have long been
areas in which a grant of federal jurisdiction has been under-
stood to include a grant of power to the federal courts to
make rules of law binding on all courts, state as well as feder-
al. 2 3  The awareness of the possible correlation between law-
making competence and jurisdiction demonstrated by these
areas does not force a conclusion that state law would have
been superseded if federal jurisdiction had been found to cover
cases involving merely patent transactions. Nonetheless, it
does underscore the unlikely nature of the possibility that fed-
eral decisional law might somehow be thought controlling in
an area where there was no opportunity for original federal
decision.124  Since the jurisdictional cases clearly embraced the
proposition that there was no controlling basis in federal statu-
tory law, rather than decisional law, the conclusion that state
law was understood to control seems strong.
The ambiguity of the second ground suggests the final
ground for supposing there was a conscious assumption that
state law controlled. Prior to the intense concern focused on
such matters by the Erie decision, 2 there was very seldom a
deliberate determination that some matters should be governed
by a nonstatutory federal law. -1 2 0  In some measure, this lack
of explicit federalization may have resulted from the fact that
123. See HIM. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLuTmL L. REv. 489, 530-33 (1954). Admiralty jurisdiction is of
course the classic example, although the role of state courts is too com-
plex to illustrate well the fealty of state courts to federal decisional law.
See also Hill, supra note 122, at 1071, suggesting that congressional con-
trol over federal judicial jurisdiction provides a form of political control
over the occasions for federal common lawmaking.
124. The alternative possibility of finding federal jurisdiction over
cases involving patent transactions as cases arising under a federal
common law of patent transactions, although not arising under the
patent statutes as such, was not available until the 1875 enactment of
general federal question jurisdiction. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1,
18 Stat. (Pt. I1) 470. Whatever else may be said of the history of the
1875 statute, it seems certain that it was not intended or understood to
interfere with the general allocation of lawmaking power. See gener-
ally Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions,
90 U. PA. L. REv. 639, 639-45 (1942); Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal
Question," 16 Tun. L. REV. 362 (1942); Forrester, Federal Question
Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 TuL. L. REV. 263 (1943).
125. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
126. E.g., Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Com-
mon Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rrv. 383, 407 (1964); Hill, The Law-Malking
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLnM. I
REV. 1024, 1035 (1967); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law":
Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules
For Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 798 (1957).
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when diversity litigation presented the opportunity, many mat-
ters could be resolved by the federal courts according to their
own views of "general" law without constraint by state court
decisions. Beyond that, it may well be that the federal courts
genuinely expected that the views of general law expressed in
diversity litigation represented, and would reinforce, some gen-
eral consensus as to what the law actually "was." In such a
setting federal courts would not feel a strong drive toward pre-
emption of state law in order to implement their own views of
good law. Further exploration of this hypothesis may well be
conducted through a review of the approach taken by federal
courts to the questions of state law raised by litigation involving
patent transactions. The conclusion may be stated briefly: the
federal courts answered many questions concerning transactions
in patent rights as matters of general law not controlled by the
decisions of any particular state court.
2. Federal Court Determination of State Law
In the pre-Erie era, state law was expressly employed by
federal courts in varying patent contexts including infringe-
ment litigation.127  For present purposes the most useful illus-
tration is provided by federal treatment of license issues. There
are only a few vague pronouncements addressed directly to the
question, 128 but it seems entirely clear that matters of license
law were treated as questions of general law as to which the
decisions of any particular state court were not controlling.'2 9
This approach was taken in a host of pre-Erie cases in which a
127. E.g., American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241
U.S. 257 (1916) (interference with plaintiff's business by assertions that
plaintiff's products infringe defendant's patent); H. C. Cook Co. v.
Beecher, 217 U.S. 497 (1910) (liability of directors on infringement judg-
ment against corporation); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610
(1895) (Rules of Decision Act adopts state statutes of limitations for
infringement suits); Motor Wheel Corp. v. Rubsam Corp., 92 F.2d 129
(6th Cir.), pet. for cert. dismissed, 302 U.S. 771 (1937), cert. denied,
304 U.S. 560 (1938) (submission of license interpretation to jury);
Mershon v. O'Neill, 12 F. Supp. 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1935) (Conformity Act
governs pleading in infringement suit by state practice).
128. See Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 12-13, 15 (1912);
New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 473 (1912);
Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75, 83 (1883). At the very
least, the statements in these cases that license and assignment ques-
tions are matters of general law do not reflect a deliberate consideration
of the issue.
129. So Justice Traynor concluded in Farmland Irrigation Co. v.
Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732, 738 (1957), without citing any
cases. Ordinarily, questions of contract interpretation were treated as
matters of general law. E.g., 6 W. HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 3764 at
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wide variety of license issues were determined either without
reference to state decisions or with reference to state decisions
at large without any indication they were more than evidence
of the general law. This same method is reflected both in liti-
gation seeking direct enforcement of the license agreement '"
and in infringement litigation involving a license defense." 1
Treatment of patent license issues as matters of general law
is not in any way inconsistent with the conclusion that state law
as such was controlling. To be sure, pre-Erie critics of the doc-
trine that federal courts were free to ignore state court deci-
sions in matters of "general" law often charged that the fed-
eral courts were creating their own unauthorized common
law.132 A few defenders of the federal practice could be found
to urge that its only shortcoming was that the federal courts
had been too timorous to compel state court adherence to their
305-11 (1931); Sharp & Brennan, The Application of the Doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson since 1900, 4 IND. L.J. 367, 372 (1929).
130. E.g., Thorn Wire Hedge Co. v. Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co.,
159 U.S. 423, 449-50 (1895); Cincinnati Siemens-Lungren Gas Illuminat-
ing Co. v. Western Siemens-Lungren Co., 152 U.S. 200 (1894); Pope Mfg.
Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892); National Pigments & Chem.
Co. v. C. K. Williams & Co., 94 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1938); Eureka Co. v.
Henney Motor Co., 91 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1937); Penley Bros. v. Han,
84 F.2d 317 (1st Cir. 1936); Krell v. Bovaird Supply Co., 83 F.2d 414(10th Cir. 1936); Vulcan Mfg. Co. v. Maytag Co., 73 F.2d 136 (8th Cir.
1934), cert. dismissed, 294 U.S. 734 (1935); Sun Oil Co. v. Red River
Ref. Co., 29 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1928); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v.
Tri-City Radio Elec. Supply Co., 23 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1927); Ben-Wat
Corp. v. David Lupton's Sons Co., 13 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1926); Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Isherwood, 5 F.2d 924 (4th Cir.),
pet. for cert. dismissed & cert. denied, 269 U.S. 552, 592 (1925); Standard
Appliance Co. v. Standard Equip. Co., 296 F. 456 (6th Cir. 1924);
Bird's-Eye Veneer Co. v. Franck-Philipson & Co., 259 F. 266 (6th Cir.
1918); Life Preserver Suit Co. v. National Life Preserver Co., 252 F. 139
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 571 (1918); Bijur Motor Lighting
Co. v. Eclipse Mach. Co., 243 F. 600 (2d Cir. 1917); Confectioners' Mach.
& Mfg. Co. v. Panoualias, 134 F. 393 (2d Cir. 1904); Leicester & Con-
tinental Mills Co. v. Macon Knitting Co., 116 F. 196 (3d Cir. 1902).
131. E.g., De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236
(1927); Topliff v. Topliff, 122 U.S. 121 (1887); Rubber Co. v. Good-
year, 76 U.S. (9 Wail.) 788, 799-800 (1869); Freeman v. Seiberling
Rubber Co., 72 F.2d 124 (6th Cir. 1934); Finley v. Asphalt Paving Co.,
69 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1934); Radio-Craft Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. &
Mfg. Co., 7 F.2d 432 (3d Cir. 1925); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v.
Cutting & Washington Radio Corp., 294 F. 671 (2d Cir. 1923); Dunkley
Co. v. California Packing Corp., 277 F. 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 257
U.S. 644 (1921).
132. E.g., J. LONG, OUTLINE OF THE JURISDICTION AND PnocEDun OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS 10, 13, 16-17, 64 (1917); 1 W. ROSE, CODE OF
FEDERAL PROCEDURE 95 (1907) (more ambiguous statements may be
found at 66, 82, 105, 113); von Moschzisker, The Common Law and our
Federal Jurisprudence, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 367, 368-69 (1926).
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views as rules of supreme federal law.1 3 3  By far the better
view, however, is that the federal courts genuinely believed
in some way we now find it hard to comprehend that they
were simply engaged in discharging the duty of determining for
themselves, as well as they could, what state law actually was,
treating state court decisions simply as evidence of state law.""'
So, to take an example from the present area, if state law
chanced to provide a statute governing some aspect of a patent
license transaction, the statute was followed without ques-
tion. 135
Again, the evidence is not by itself conclusive, but in total
there seems no escape from the conclusion that federal courts
were bound to the view that state law controlled many aspects
of patent transactions, and were aware of the view, long be-
fore the Erie decision redefined the federalistic ground rules
for measuring judicial lawmaking authority. The remainder
of the story is that of attempting to locate the boundaries in
which state law operates today as a foundation for the inquiry
whether the boundaries should be redrawn. The balance of
this section will explore the boundaries of each of the major
areas in which state law now affects patent rights.
B. LICENSE AGREEMAENTS
1. In General
The historic ground for excluding license litigation from
federal patent jurisdiction was in large part that licenses have
no statutory basis. This explanation is still ordinarily offered in
133. E.g., Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made State
Law in State and Federal Courts, 4 ILL. L. REV. (Nw. U.L. Rev.) 533
(1910).
134. Contemporary statements of commentators include 3 R. FosTER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 2455 (6th ed. 1921); R. HUGHES, HANDBOOK OF JUIS-
DICTION AND PROCEDURE IN UNITED STATES COURTS 6-7 (2d ed. 1913).
One of the clearest statements by the Supreme Court is provided
by Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1882). The most delightful
illustration is doubtless Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman, 169 F. 1 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 518 (1909). After stating in painful de-
tail that federal diversity courts are simply engaged in determining
from all available evidence what state law may be and are not attempt-
ing to create a body of federal common law, the court determined that a
decision of the highest state court growing out of the very fact situa-
tion before it did not represent state law.
The most thoughtful current statement is H. M. Hart, Jr., The Re-
lations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 505
(1954).
135. See Radio Corp. of America v. Cable Radio Tube Corp., 66 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 703 (1934), applying the state
statute of frauds to bar proof of a claimed oral license.
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statements that licenses, as all other ordinary contracts, are
governed by state law.130 Patent license forms, indeed, fre-
quently include provisions choosing which state's law is to be
applied to their construction and enforcement.137
In line with this general statement, decisions may readily
be found referring a wide variety of common contractual
problems to state law. State law has been applied to such pat-
ent license issues as defining the general rules of interpre-
tation, 38 capacity to contract,139 fraudulent procurement of
the license, 40 the "shop right" of an employer to a license of
employee inventions,1 4  consideration, 42 failure of considera-
tion1 43 and perhaps eviction, 14 4 definiteness required of a con-
136. E.g., R. NoDHAus, PATENT LIcENSE AcREEMNTs 2-3 (1967);
2 W. ROBINSON, PATENTS § 806 (1890); IL TouLmmN, HANDBOOK OF PAT-
mNTS 433 (1954); Shaw & Allen, Patent Assignments and Licenses, in
PATENTS, RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT 347, 351 (H. Forman, ed. 1961).
Recent recommendations for statutory clarification of the licensable
nature of patents seem to be aimed at establishing the legitimacy of
various license terms against possible claims of misuse, rather than
federalizing license law. E.g., PREsmDNn's COzMMSSION ON THE PAMvNT
SYsTEm, "To Promote the Progress of the ... Useful Arts," Recommen-
dation XXII; S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
137. E.g., W. NAViN, PATENTS 103 (rev. ed. 1966); R. NorDHAus,
PATENT LICENSE AGREEnmNTs 211-12 (1967); A. SEEL, WHAT THE GEN-
ERAL PRAcTITIoNER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE,
163, 167 (1966). Western Geo. Co. v. Bolt Assoc., Inc., 1972 Trade Cases
I 73872 (D. Conn.).
138. E.g., U.S. Inds., Inc. v. Camco, Inc., 277 F.2d 292, 293, 297 (5th
Cir. 1960); Peerless Weighing & Vending Mach. Corp. v. international
Ticket Scale Corp., 126 F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir. 1942).
139. E.g., R. ELLIs, PATENT LIENSES § 78 (A. Deller ed. 1958).
140. Globe Steel Abrasive Co. v. National Metal Abrasive Co., 101
F.2d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1939).
141. See Standard Brands Inc. v. U.S. Partition & Packaging Corp.,
199 F. Supp. 161, 176-77 (E.D. Wis. 1961). Several other cases may be
found in which shop-right questions are apparently treated as subject
to state law, but without express discussion. E.g., Jamesbury Corp. v.
Worcester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205 (1st Cir. 1971); Gate-Way, Inc. v.
Hi]llgren, 82 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1949), affd per curiam, 181 F.2d
1010 (9th Cir. 1950); Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 157 N.E.2d 505,
184 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1959).
142. E.g., Autographic Register Co. v. Philip Hano Co., 198 F.2d 208
(1st Cir. 1952) (performance of preexisting obligation as consideration
for modification of contract); Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Ziegler,
151 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1945).
143. National Foam System v. Urquhart, 202 F.2d 659, 661 (3d Cir.
1953).
144. Eviction involves such matters as rulings in litigation involv-
ing other parties that the licensed patent is invalid or much narrower
than originally supposed. E.g., Patterson-Baliagh Corp. v. Byron Jack-
son Co., 145 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1944); Wynne v. Allen, 245 N.C. 421, 96
S.E.2d 422 (1957); Previto, License on an Invalid Patent, in 2 PRAcTrcAL
PATENT LICENSING 86, 92 (A. Davis, Jr. ed. 1969).
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tractual promise,145 statutes of frauds, 1 40 the peculiar conse-
quences of sealed instruments,1 4 7 the parol evidence rule,1'18 im-
plied warranties, 149 assignability of the licensee's rights, '5
the dependency of mutual promises and waiver of breach by
continuing performance,' 5 ' capacity to be sued,152 choice of law
rules,15 3 rescission,' 5 4 and reformation. 55  Separate mention
deserves to be made of a state court division of the proceeds of
a federal infringement judgment between licensor and exclu-
sive licensee, quite apparently as a matter of state law.15 0
In Scherr v. Difco Labs., 401 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1968), the court
expressly left open the question whether eviction should be treated as
a question of state or federal law. See Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn
Bicycle Co., 334 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), discussed in note 157
infra.
145. Price v. Block, 124 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1941).
146. E.g., Matthews v. Continental Roll & Steel Foundry Co., 121
F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1941); Radio Corp. of America v. Cable Radio Tube
Corp., 66 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 703 (1934);
Gate-Way, Inc. v. Hillgren, 82 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1949), afl'd per
curiam, 181 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1950); Kurtz v. Ford Motor Co., 62 F.
Supp. 255 (E.D. Mich. 1945); Duggan v. Mills Novelty Co., 53 U.S.P.Q.
123 (W.D. Pa. 1942). As might be guessed, difficulty is commonly en-
countered with statutory provisions relating to agreements not to be
performed within a year from the making.
147. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Ziegler, 151 F.2d 784 (3d Cir.
1945).
148. E.g., Black v. Richfield Oil Corp., 146 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945); Price v. Block, 124 F.2d 738 (7th
Cir. 1941).
149. At the least, general discussions of implied warranties in patent
licenses approach the matter as one of general contract doctrine with-
out any indication that federal law imposes any limitations on state law.
E.g., R. ELLIS, PATENT LICENSES ch. 27 (A. Deller ed. 1958); Comment,
Implied Warranties in Patent, Know-How and Technical Assistance
Licensing Agreements, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 168 (1968).
150. Sunnen v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 171, 175 (8th Cir. 1947),
rev'd on other grounds, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Farmland Irrigation Co. v.
Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732 (1957). See generally
Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 606 (1959).
151. Specialties Development Corp. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co.,
207 F.2d 753, 755-56 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 919 (1954).
152. Price v. Block, 124 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1941).
153. E.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941);
Specialties Development Corp. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 207 F.2d 753,
754 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 919 (1954); Autographic Regis-
ter Co. v. Philip Hano Co., 198 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1952).
154. Cf. Bowers Mfg. Co. v. All-Steel Equip., Inc., 275 F.2d 809
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 812 (1960) (state statute does not
permit licensee to rescind since it provides merely a vehicle, rather
than added substantive basis, for rescission).
155. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Metals Disintegrating Co., 176 F.2d 90
(3d Cir. 1949); Black v. Richfield Oil Corp., 146 F.2d 801 (9th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945).
156. Contour Chair-Lounge Co. v. Laskowitz, 330 S.W.2d 817 (Mo.
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2. Federal Law Incursions
The fact that state law is recognized as controlling on the
wide range of ordinary contractual questions has not prevented
the preemptive application of federal law on specific issues. By
far the clearest recent example is found in the ruling that as
a matter of federal patent law, and perhaps antitrust law as well,
state courts may not apply state law to estop a licensee from
challenging the validity of the licensed patent.15 7 Closely paral-
lel principles are embodied in the entire range of decisions pro-
hibiting various license practices as misuse; these rulings rest
on federal patent law, and often federal antitrust law as well,
and clearly preclude state court enforcement of the unlawful li-
cense provisions. 5 8
Although equally clear pronouncements have not been
found, it seems almost inevitable that federal common law prin-
ciples will likewise be applied to patent licenses between the
federal government and private parties, whether the govern-
ment is licensor 59 or licensee.160 There is no apparent reason
1959). But cf. Overman Cushion Tire Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 59 F.2d 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 651 (1932).
157. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Compare Scherr v.
Difco Labs., 401 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1968) (leaving open the question
whether federal or state law controls a claim of eviction by judicial
declaration of invalidity of the licensed patent). In Troxel Mfg. Co.
v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 334 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), the court
concluded that federal policy requires refund of royalties paid by the
licensee prior to judicial declaration of patent invalidity.
158. E.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964) (reversing a
state court judgment for royalties due under a patent license on the
ground that federal law prohibits a royalty arrangement found to ex-
tend the patent beyond its expiration).
A clear early statement that federal law controls misuse questions
is found in the ill-starred decision in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S.
1, 17, 19 (1912). The substance of the misuse ruling was overruled in
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
518 (1917). The often hybrid role of patent and antitrust principles is
beautifully illustrated in Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.,
317 U.S. 173, 175-77 (1942). See also MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec.
& Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 407 (1947).
Leading discussions of general misuse principles may be found in
Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An
Economic Analysis, 76 YArx L.J. 267 (1966); Turner, The Patent System
and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 450 (1969).
159. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 1245.200-.209 (1971) (licensing proced-
ures of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration). The cur-
rent Statement of Government Patent Policy, Section 2, declares that
under regulations prescribed by the Administrator of General Services,
government-owned patents are to be made available through dedication
or licensing on an exclusive or nonexclusive basis. See 36 Fed. Reg.
16887, 16891 (1971). Licenses issued under such regulations are not
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to suppose that the general tendency to remove government
contracts from the ambit of state law will be relaxed in this
area.16
Compulsory licenses required by express federal statute
likewise seem prime candidates for federal governance. The
Atomic Energy Commission, for instance, is authorized by
statute to declare that patents relating to atomic energy are
affected with a public interest, and to require that they be li-
censed to others.' 62 Likewise, the Clean Air Amendments of
1970 contain almost incredibly complicated provisions author-
izing a district court to order licensing of patents needed for
compliance with the act.' 63  It would be highly surprising, to
say the least, to discover that licenses issued under such schemes
were to be controlled by state law. Even licenses voluntarily
issued against the pressure of this background might be re-
garded as appropriate subjects for federal control. Beyond
such statutes and the not infrequent licensing provisions of
federal antitrust decrees, 64 proposals have frequently been
made for some more generalized mandatory licensing obliga-
tion.165 Adoption of any such scheme would doubtless cause
federal law to swallow up state law completely.
likely to be subject to state regulation, whatever is made of the prior
situation. (A brief review of some of the literature on government
patent practices is Raskin, Government Patent Policy Revisited: Reflec-
tions Occasioned by President's 1971 Memorandum, 15 IDEA 340 (1971).)
160. See, e.g., AMP Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448 (Ct. Cl.),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 964 (1968).
161. E.g., United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1970);
Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411, 414 (1947); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (1970). See 10 C.F.R. Part 81 (1971); Note,
Compulsory Licensing of Patents Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
43 GEo. L.J. 221 (1955); Note, The Constitutionality of the Patent Provi-
sions of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, 22 U. CH. L. R-V. 920 (1955).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1971). See Schwartz, Mandatory Patent
Licensing of Air Pollution Control Technology, 57 VA. L. REV. 719
(1971).
164. See Massel, The Patent System and Economic Development,
46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 486, 499 n.54 (1971).
165. See Massel, supra note 164, at 488-89, 499; Turner, The Patent
System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 450, 456, 474-76
(1969); Note, Compulsory Licensing of Patents, 6 GEO. WAsH. L. REV.
499 (1938); Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy
[Neal Report] (July 5, 1968), in 1 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 633,
697-700, 779-94 (1969). The newly revised Statement of Government
Patent Policy includes provisions for requiring government contractors
to issue licenses under patents which they have been allowed to retain.
See 36 Fed. Reg. 16887, 16891 (1971).
It is generally accepted that a patentee has no obligation to license
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Apart from such full-license regulation, federal statutes
have also occasionally been adopted to control some specific
aspect of patent licensing. The Royalty Adjustment Act of
World War H, for instance, provided machinery for reducing
the royalties paid by government contractors under patent
licenses. 66 And the Patent Code presently provides that any
agreement settling an interference proceeding in the Patent
Office shall be filed with the Patent Office under sanction of
permanent unenforceability.'67
The foregoing illustrations have represented direct federal
regulation of relationships which can easily be classified with
traditional license arrangements. Two final illustrations remain,
providing by their very ambiguity a suggestion of the lines along
which the role of federal law could very easily be expanded
further.
First, and more general, are cases dealing with "implied"
licenses. Some of these cases involve situations resting on ordi-
nary contract principles and are of no particular importance.
Others, however, rest on findings in infringement litigation
that the conduct of the patent owner with respect to the
infringer is of such a character that it would be inequitable to
his patent E.g., La Salle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson,
Inc., 445 F.2d 84, 94-96 (7th Cir. 1971); Sylvania Ind. Corp. v. Visking
Corp., 132 F.2d 947, 958 (4th Cir.), pet. for cert. dismissed, 319 U.S. 777
(1943). Nonetheless, it is reported that the Department of Justice has
exerted pressure on patent owners to grant additional licenses, appar-
ently where some licenses have already been issued. See 117 CONG.
Rsc. S. 3404, 3409 (March 19, 1971) (memorandum of the American Pat-
ent Law Association). One court, without citation of authority, has con-
cluded that once a patent owner has issued a license, it must issue
licenses on nondiscriminatory terms to competitors of the licensee. Al-
lied Research Prods., Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 300 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ill.
1969). See 161 U.S.P.Q. 527 for findings of fact.
166. Act of October 31, 1942, ch. 634, 56 Stat. 1013. Although the
Act expired in 1953, it continued to produce litigation results at least
through 1964. See Lewis v. United States, 338 F.2d 114 (CL CL 1964);
United States v. Frank B. illian Co., 335 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1964). The
statutory reference to "license" arrangements was interpreted broadly.
See Coffman v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 927 (CL C1. 1951).
167. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (c). Patent Office practice has long allowed the
recording of license agreements with the warning that such recording
does not have any constructive notice effect for want of statutory
foundation. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.331 (1971) (Rules of Practice in Patent
Cases). The Neal Report recommended that, even apart from its com-
pulsory licensing proposals, statutory provision should be made requir-
ing the recording of all patent licenses with strong sanctions for non-
filing. See Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy
(July 5, 1968), in 1 J. RPRiNTs A=UST L. & EcoN. 633, 699, 779-80,
784 (1969).
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allow enforcement of the patent. Frequently such findings are
expressly referred to "estoppel" principles. There is no indi-
cation that decisions of this class are thought to depend on state-
law principles, whether of implied contract or estoppel; instead,
the courts appear to be proceeding on concepts they believe to
be part of federal infringement law.168 Closely related ap-
proaches appear to be reflected in older cases dealing with
such problems as the right of a purchaser from an exclusive
grantee of patent rights in one territory to use or sell the
product in the territory of another exclusive grantee,1 9 or the
right of a licensee-purchaser under an original patent term to
continue to use the patented machine during an extension of
the patent term.170 The decisions are cast in terms defining the
basic scope of the patent protection: the particular product
has been found to have lost the protection by virtue of the sale.
If license problems were approached as problems of defining
the scope of basic patent protection and of the power of the
patentee to modify the original protection by consensual ar-
rangements with others, it would be easily possible to reach the
conclusion that all license matters are inherently matters of fed-
eral law. The alternate perspective suggested by the implied
license cases may be an even easier basis for federalization:
licenses are frequently characterized as simply a defense to an
infringement claim, 17 1 and the thought that federal law should
control the extent to which defenses are available to federal
claims hardly seems startling.
The second line of ambiguous illustration ties directly into
the view that licenses should be treated simply as defenses to
federal infringement claims. The Supreme Court has apparently
treated the effects of a release of claims for past infringement
168. E.g., Kierulff v. Metropolitan Stevedore Co., 315 F.2d 839 (9th
Cir. 1963); Lukens Steel Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 197 F.2d 939
(2d Cir. 1952); Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d
550 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950).
169. Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895).
The Court suggested that an express contractual limitation imposed by
the original seller would be governed by state law; today the answer
would almost surely be in favor of federal antitrust law.
170. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852). See also
Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340 (1863).
171. A nice statement is that although licenses have been described
as a mere waiver of the patentee's right to sue since they pass no
interest in the patent, "a contract of license is and can be a most valu-
able and enforceable right." U.S. Inds., Inc. v. Otis Engr'g Corp., 277
F.2d 282, 291 (5th Cir. 1960).
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as a question of federal patent law.172 Judge Friendly has fol-
lowed this lead to a conclusion that federal courts are not bound
by state law in determining the incidents of a covenant not to
sue for infringement,1 73 although leaving open the question
whether state law might be adopted voluntarily as federal law.
License arrangements may be distinguished, of course, to the ex-
tent that they involve private attempts to order future conduct
which arguably need to be integrated with the fabric of state
law; presumably releases of claims for past activities are more
easily treated simply as a matter of federal concern. 4 The
distinction is nonetheless a refined one, and the principle of
federal concern recognized in these cases could easily expand
to embrace all license transactions.
Whatever these various examples of federal intrusion on
licensing law presage, they at least demonstrate that licensing
is not an exclusive preserve of state law. So far the admixture
of federal law has been confined to the periphery; whether it
should be spread further will be examined after review of the
other major areas of consensual and nonconsensual patent trans-
actions.
C. AssIGNMEmS
1. Federal Law
In large measure, assignments are treated as contracts1 "
whose enforcement is not a proper matter for federal jurisdic-
tion. 176 Unlike licenses, however, assignments have a direct
172. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S.
476, 500-02 (1964). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 342-48 (1971).
173. Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 363 F.2d 1002, 1006-07
(2d Cir. 1966).
174. The covenant not to sue in the Artvale case extended to con-
duct occurring in the future; to this extent it seems impossible to dis-
tinguish its effects from the effects of a paid up or royalty-free non-
exclusive license, unless the poorly drafted agreement was thought to
rest on a mutual understanding that the items covered by the covenant
not to sue were not within the scope of the patent.
An interesting parallel illustration is provided by licenses entered
after the licensee has been enjoined from infringing the patent. Such
licenses have been held to suspend the force of the injunction. See
Holmes v. Atlas Garage Door Co., 63 F. Supp. 692, 694-95 (S.D. Cal.
1945). The impact of the license on federal infringement litigation is
dramatically clear in such situations.
175. E.g., Nicholson Pavement Co. v. Jenkins, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
452, 456 (1871).
176. E.g., Odell v. F. C. Farnsworth Co., 250 U.S. 501 (1919).
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foundation in the Patent Code. Section 261 expressly pro-
vides that patents and applications for patent are "assignable
in law by an instrument in writing." Provision is made for
recording, acknowledgment, and territorially limited assign-
ments for part of the United States. 177 Federal law clearly con-
trols direct application of these statutory provisions. Ques-
tions closely related to the express statutory provisions are
also apparently treated as matters of federal law, as when
courts have been faced with a question of the need for formal
"delivery" of a written assignment, 178 or of the authority of a
state judicial officer to assign a patent in the process of execut-
ing a state judgment.179
As with licenses, there are further areas in which assign-
ment questions not directly related to statutory provisions are
treated as matters of federal law. The clearest example is pro-
vided by the ruling that the patentee may not assign rights
against a single infringer, accompanied by a statement that
Patent property is the creature of statute law and its incidents
are equally so and depend upon the construction to be given to
the statutes creating it and them, in view of the policy of Con-
gress in their enactments.' 8 0
So too, the limits on estoppel of an assignor to challenge a pat-
ent when sued for its infringement after the assignment have
been clearly rested on federal law."8
2. State Law
Notwithstanding the expressly federal nature of some as-
signment questions, as in the examples just noted, state law
continues to control a large range of essentially contractual
assignment questions. One decision delightfully illustrating the
proximity such questions may have to federal questions ruled
177. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970). The origins of the provision for assign-
ments for part of the United States are traced in Baxter, Legal Re-
strictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analy-
sis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 348-52 (1966). See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 118, 152, 154,
251 (1970) (other statutory references to the rights of assignees).
178. Etten v. Lovell Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 844, 847 (3d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 966 (1956).
179. E.g., McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 138 F.2d
493 (3d Cir. 1943). Compare Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics,
Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 853-54 (2d Cir. 1963) (dictum).
180. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S.
24, 40 (1923).
181. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 254-57
(1945).
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in line with ample authority that assignments might be enforced
as a matter of state law even though the formal requirements
of the federal statute had not been satisfied. 18 2 Like the license
litany, additional cases may be cited which refer to state law
such matters as general rules of construction,'8 3 capacity to as-
sign,184 fraudulent procurement of the assignment,18 the obliga-
tions of employees to assign inventions to their employers,
1 8 6
failure of consideration,1 8 7 the parol evidence rule, 8 8 statutes
of limitations, 8 9 and breach of express warranty. 0 0 One court
has even apparently looked to state law to determine whether
assignment of the merely expectant sort of interest repre-
sented by a patent application is valid.' 9 '
It hardly needs noting that state law may easily refer as-
signment contract questions back to federal law. A common
example is provided by employee contracts to assign inven-
tions, which are frequently interpreted to provide for assign-
ment only of patentable inventions. 92
182. Toner v. Sobelman, 86 F. Supp. 369, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
183. Geolograph Co. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 251 F.2d 261, 262 n.1
(10th Cir. 1958); Lang v. Patent Tile Co., 216 F.2d 254, 255 (5th Cir.
1954).
184. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 257 (1891); Laning v.
National Ribbon & Carbon Paper Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.
1942) (capacity of dissolved corporation to assign); R. ELLIS, PATENT
AssIGNmENTs §§ 10, 11 (3d ed. 1955).
185. E.g., Wade v. Lawder, 165 U.S. 624 (1897); Chicago Fittings
Corp. v. Howe, 309 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Cf. Page v. Dickerson,
28 Wis. 694 (1871).
186. E.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Worcester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205,
207 n.1 (1st Cir. 1971); Dill Mfg. Co. v. Goff, 125 F.2d 676 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 672 (1942); Aloe Creme Labs. v. Farkas, 145
U.S.P.Q. 649 (S.D. Fla. 1965); Standard Brands Inc. v. U.S. Partition &
Packaging Corp., 199 F. Supp. 161, 176-77 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Hartley
Pen Co. v. Lindy Pen Co., 16 F.R.D. 141, 149 (S.D. Cal. 1954), aff'd, 237
F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1956).
187. Chicago Fittings Corp. v. Howe, 309 F. Supp. 625 (ND. l.
1970).
188. Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 437 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1971); Toner
v. Sobelman, 86 F. Supp. 369 (ED. Pa. 1949).
189. Hartley Pen Co. v. Lindy Pen Co., 16 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Cal.
1954), affd, 237 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1956).
190. Gate-Way, Inc. v. Hillgren, 82 F. Supp. 546, 551 (S.D. Cal.
1949), affd per curi am, 181 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1950).
191. National Athletic Supply Corp. v. Muscle-Matic, Inc., 164
U.S.P.Q. 10, 15-16 (M.D. Fla. 1968), alfd on other grounds, 421 F.2d 407
(5th Cir. 1970). Since the court quotes the statutory provisions allowing
assignment of an application for patent, the subsequent reference to state
law is at the least obscure.
192. E.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Worcester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205
(1st Cir. 1971). See note 186 supra.
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3. The Distinction Between License and Assignment
Paradoxically, the fact that state law controls many ques-
tions of both assignment and license enforcement has not pre-
vented application of controlling federal principles to deter-
mine for some purposes the characteristics which distinguish
licenses from assignments. 193  The most important context in
which the distinction is made involves standing to sue a third
party for infringement.'9 4  An assignee may sue; a mere licen-
see may not; and an exclusive licensee may sue only if the
licensor is joined. 9 5 The label used by the parties to describe
their arrangement does not control the characterization of the
agreement. 96 It hardly seems surprising that federal courts
should wish to determine for themselves the principles of
standing for infringement plaintiffs nor do such decisions in-
trude significantly on the domain of state law. Nonetheless,
the very clarity of the reasons underlying federal control pro-
vides one further demonstration of the proximity of contrac-
tual patent transactions to important federal policies.
Federal tax laws provide a more remote illustration of the
tendency of courts to resort to federal law to measure the
differences between assignment and license transactions. Since
there is no important connection to patent policies as such, this
area may be left to marginal citation.197
The mixture of state and federal law, in short, is somewhat
more federalized for assignments than it is for licenses. The
vital point in both cases, however, is that in a wide variety of
situations reasons have been found in patent policy to over-
come the basic supposition that state law controls.
193. It was once fashionable to refer to an assignment of all patent
rights for a defined territory as a "grant." This usage has virtually
disappeared. See R. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS 68 (3d ed. 1955).
194. The patent, indeed, grants the right to exclude others from
practicing the invention to the patentee, his heirs, "or assigns." 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
195. Interesting contemporary illustrations of these principles may
be found in Grantham v. McGraw-Edison Co., 444 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.
1971); Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods. Co., 352 F.2d 443 (8th Cir.
1965); Consolidated Vacuum Corp. v. Machine Dynamics, Inc., 230 F.
Supp. 70 (S.D. Cal. 1964). See also Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully &
Jeffery Mfg. Co. (No. 3), 144 U.S. 248 (1892).
196. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
197. E.g., Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d
1004 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Kronner v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 730 (Ct. Cl.
1953).
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D. Co-OwNm AGREEMENs
1. General Incidents of Co-Ownership
Co-ownership of patents arises, ordinarily, because the
patented invention is the work of two or more inventors. In
such. circumstances it is required that all co-inventors be
named in the application, and the patent issues to all jointly
unless there is a prior assignment of interests.18 Alterna-
tively, co-ownership may arise because of assignment of a
fractional interest in the patent; 190 the incidents of co-owner-
ship, however, are such as to make this course generally un-
attractive.
The basic statutory statement of the rights of co-owners is
that "[i]n the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each
of the joint owners of a patent may make, use or sell the pat-
ented invention without the consent of and without account-
ing to the other owners."20 0  These rights extend to licensing
others, in competition with the co-owners if events happen that
way, without any obligation to share the royalties.2 0 1  Suits
for infringement, on the other hand, must be prosecuted by all
co-owners; and it seems to be accepted that although one co-
owner may license others, one may not effectively release the
claims of the remaining co-owners for past infringement.20
2
The precarious nature of co-ownership should be appar-
ent from this brief recital of its general incidents. Each co-
owner is at the mercy of the other. Presumably vindictive
destruction of the joint property by free licensing of all takers
would be a rare event. Differential ability to exploit the in-
vention, however, whether because of ability to practice it di-
rectly or because of superior ability to entice others into li-
censes, may restrict the value of the weaker co-owner's interest
considerably.20 3 And if effective exploitation requires an ex-
198. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1970). Some of the more elaborate complica-
tions are sketched in Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v.
Sperry Rand Corp., 444 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1971). See also Turchan v.
Bailey Meter Co., 19 F.R.D. 201 (D. Del. 1956).
199. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
200. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1970).
201. E.g., A. SEmNE, WHAT T=n GENEmAL PRAcTnTONm1 SHouLD KNow
ABouT PATENT LAw A PRACTICE 88 (1966). See Ragan v. Sirigo,
160 Cal. App. 2d 832, 326 P.2d 26 (1958).
202. See Union Trust Nat'l Bank v. Audio Devices, Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Cf. Milgram v. Jiffy Equip. Co., 362 Mo.
1194, 1200-01, 247 S.W.2d 668, 672-73 (1952).
203. Milgram v. Jiffy Equip. Co., 362 Mo. 1194, 247 S.W.2d 668
(1952) provides a graphic example of the difficulties which may result
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clusive license, nothing can be done unless all joint owners join
in the agreement.
2. Co-Owner Agreements
Patent experts are in clear agreement that the ordinary
incidents of co-ownership just sketched require that co-owners
of patents join in agreements among themselves to modify the
relationships otherwise prescribed by law.20 4 The current statu-
tory definition of the rights of joint owners, indeed, is condi-
tioned on "the absence of any agreement to the contrary. 20 r
The basic attempt, of course, is to substitute some form of
cooperative exploitation for the risks of competitive exploita-
tion built into the joint ownership.
Federal law might be thought to have an important role to
play in limiting co-owner agreements. There is an express
statutory recognition of such arrangements. Practical neces-
sity is commonly thought to compel private arrangements to
undo the incidents of ownership mandated by operation of fed-
eral law. Surprisingly, however, the only clear ruling on the
subject is that co-owner agreements are controlled by state
law.20 6 Although the definition of co-owner rights was added
to the Patent Code in 195 2,20 , long after this ruling, there is
little reason to seize on the new and oblique statutory refer-
ence to co-owner agreements as providing in itself a basis for
superseding state law. Co-owner agreements may be cast not
only in the form of a direct contract regulating the rights of the
joint owners, but may also be cast in the form of license arrange-
ments between them20 8 or in some combination of mutual as-
signments or licenses which include the conditions regulating
the rights of the parties.20 9 Unless all forms of co-owner agree-
even when the co-owners have attempted to regulate their affairs by
agreement.
204. E.g., A. SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTIT1ONER SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 88 (1966); Turner, Joint Ownership
of Patents is Dynamite, 42 Los ANGELES BAR BULL. 115 (1967). Some
would substitute the conclusion that title to a patent should never be
placed in two or more people. E.g., Cheever, The Rights of Joint Own-
ers of a Patent, 2 MICH. L. REV. 446 (1904).
205. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1970).
206. Felix v. Scharnweber, 125 U.S. 54 (1888).
207. 35 U.S.C.A. § 262 (1970) (reviser's note).
208. E.g., Rail-Trailer Co. v. ACF Inds., Inc., 358 F.2d 15 (7th Cir.
1966).
209. E.g., Rawlings v. National Molasses Co., 394 F.2d 645 (9th
Cir. 1968). It has been suggested that co-owner agreements are so im-
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ments are to be federalized, there is little sense in dividing con-
trolling authority according to the form the agreement happens
to assume. And federalization of this particular category of
license or assignment agreements without going further into
other categories may seem to be drawing exceedingly fine lines.
State law may actually play as legitimate a role in this area
as in the area of ordinary license and assignment agreements.
Impractical as the basic relations between co-owners may seem
in many circumstances, it is clear that federal law must provide
a-basic framework which facilitates exploitation of the patent
during its life. Paralysis is avoided by the general incidents
of co-ownership; but if co-owners may cooperate at least to the
extent of substituting some other incidents, there may be no
strong intrusion on basic federal policy. So, for instance, if co-
owners wish to enter into a transaction which simply suspends
the rule that all must join in suit for infringement but other-
wise leaves their relationship entirely unchanged, it is difficult
to find an affirmative federal interest which is thwarted.21 0
As with license and assignment agreements, there is the pos-
sibility of peripheral federal control of some particular terms.
So far, the only rulings are negative: it is neither patent mis-
use nor an antitrust violation for co-owners to enter into ar-
rangements which subject exploitation of the patent to joint or
even single control. 211 There seems little reason to suppose that
co-owner agreements are peculiarly exempt from federal con-
trol, however, and the basic mixture of state and federal law
portant that they should ordinarily be cast in the form of reciprocal
assignments so that they may be recorded and gain the effect of con-
structive notice to nonparties. R. ELLIs, PATENT ASSIGNM-NTS §§ 405,
406 (3d ed. 1955). Absent recording, nonparties dealing with a single
co-owner are not bound by restrictions placed on his rights to deal with
the patent by agreement with another co-owner. See Talbot v. Quaker
State Oil Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1939).
210. Rawlings v. National Molasses Co., 394 F.2d 645 (9th Cir.
1968), approved an arrangement under which the co-owner who did
not wish to be a party to the infringement litigation assigned its interest
to the other co-owner and took back an unlimited, royalty-free, non-
exclusive and noncancellable right to make, use and sell the products,
and to sublicense others to do so. Since the question is one of parties
to infringement litigation, it seems likely that federal law would
control this particular question, just as with the distinction between
assignments and licenses for such purposes. See Part H (C) (3) supra.
211. Rail-Trailer Co. v. ACF Inds., Inc., 358 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1966);
Malco Ifg. Co. v. National Connector Corp., 151 U.S.P.Q. 255 (D.
Minn. 1966), r'ev'd on other grounds, 392 F.2d 766 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 928 (1968).
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is apt to be simply a third variation on the basic license and
assignment theme.
E. AGREEMENTS NOT To INFRINGE
Formal contractual agreements not to infringe a patent are
not uncommon, occurring most frequently as a means of settling
actual or threatened infringement litigation.2 12 Although the
issue has not been addressed recently, it seems to be assumed
that such agreements are subject to state law.213 Enforcement
has been granted in some cases without regard to the validity
of the patent involved,2 14 although invalidity may be accepted
as a ground for reducing the measure of damages. 21 5 If patent
validity were indeed irrelevant to the enforceability of such
agreements, the problems involved might be simply a converse
illustration of the problems raised by license agreements. The
probability that federal law requires nonenforcement whenever
the patent is invalid or not infringed, however, suggests that
there is simply no room for state law at all.
Agreements not to infringe may be justified most readily on
the ground that they provide a private means of accomplishing
the same relief as a successful suit for an injunction against in-
fringement. In ordinary contexts, such avoidance of public de-
termination of a private quarrel by means of mutually accept-
able agreement would seem highly desirable. But the basis on
which the Supreme Court has overruled licensee estoppel is
that a mutually desired private agreement may not be allowed
212. E.g., R. NORDHAUS, PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 229 (1967).
See also Hilton, Federal and State Court Competency To Adjudicate
Cases Involving Patent Rights, 36 CONN. B.J. 281, 287 (1962). In
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295 (9th
Cir. 1970), it is duly reported that the patentee had charged some 25
other parties with infringement of its design patent and had secured
agreements not to infringe from approximately 20 of them. (The rest
were licensed.) The court's affirmance of a summary judgment of
patent invalidity may offer some indication that such agreements are
not difficult to secure even with patents of dubious validity.
213. United Lens Corp. v. Doray Lamp Co., 93 F.2d 969 (7th Cir.
1937); Coty, Inc. v. Bourjois, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
214. E.g., United Lens Corp. v. Doray Lamp Co., 93 F.2d 969, 973
(7th Cir. 1937); Battelle Development Corp. v. Angevine-Funke, Inc.,
165 U.S.P.Q. 776 (Ohio Comm. P1. 1970).
215. Eno v. Prime Mfg. Co., 314 Mass. 686, 50 N.E.2d 401 (1943).
It seems probable that infringement will ordinarily be insisted upon as
an element of violation, Texsteam Corp. v. Blanchard, 352 F.2d 983 (5th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 936 (1967), although it is not incon-
ceivable that a court might conclude that the parties had agreed that a
particular product was an infringement.
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to stand in the way of the vital public interest in securing a
judicial review of patent validity at the behest of anyone so far
interested as to be practicing the patented invention or some-
thing akin to it.2 16 At a minimum, this reasoning must carry
with it the conclusion that a suit for violation of an agreement
not to infringe may be defended on grounds of invalidity as well
as noninfringement.2 17 Once the issues of invalidity and non-
infringement are injected, however, there is very little left to be
accomplished by the agreement not to infringe. Even a stipula-
tion of liquidated damages would almost certainly have to be
qualified on the ground that recognizing it as anything more
than evidence of a reasonable royalty would allow private sanc-
tions to unduly discourage subsequent infringing conduct and
challenge to the patent.
Once the role of agreements not to infringe is restricted as
suggested above, the only real function served by such agree-
ments would be to allow infringement litigation to be trans-
ferred to state jurisdiction by private agreement. So long as
federal infringement jurisdiction remains exclusive, this result
is nonsensical. As a matter of federal law, such agreements
should be ruled void.218
This conclusion raises a difficult question as to the role of
state law in enforcing license restrictions as a breach of con-
tract. If naked agreements not to infringe are preempted, there
is no ready answer to the proposition that state law likewise
should be barred from enforcing a license agreement to confine
practice of the patented invention to a certain product, period
of time, or the like. In the past, state courts have indeed im-
plied agreements not to infringe following the termination
216. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
217. The court went almost this far in Massillon-Cleveland-Akron
Sign Co. v. Golden State Ad. Co., 444 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1971). The
primary focus was on the question whether invalidity may be raised
by a party charged with inducing breach of an agreement not to in-
fringe; the conclusion, however, is expressed that "a valid patent is a
prerequisite to recovery for inducing the breach of a contract not to in-
fringe, as well as a prerequisite to recovery for the breach itself." 444
F.2d at 428.
218. Parallel problems are raised by agreements not to practice
unpatented "inventions." To the extent that legitimate trade secrets
are involved, the role of state law is at least temporarily secure. Pain-
ton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). Apart from such
situations, it is difficult to imagine that state law will be allowed any
significant room outside of the areas in which agreements not to com-
pete at all have been allowed as incidents of employment or contracts
for the sale of a business.
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of a license,219 or not to infringe by making products other
than those covered by a limited license.220  One possible dis-
tinction is that the license agreement accomplishes a positive
permission to practice the invention, and that so long as federal
law does not prohibit every possible form of restriction on the
licensee, state law may enforce the restrictions just as readily
as it may enforce the positive obligations undertaken by the
licensee. Perhaps this distinction is sufficient. Its strength,
however, depends on the strength of the overall case for al-
lowing state law to continue its traditional role in governing
license transactions. The fact that it is again almost certain
that state law must allow defenses of invalidity and noninfringe-
ment simply adds one more arrow to the quiver of questions
about the present role of state license law.
F. OwNERsHIP
Federal law provides the basic condition of patent owner-
ship that patent protection must rest on the right of the inventor
or all co-inventors. 221  Disposition of the inventor's right is a
matter of assignment, subject to the blend of state and federal
law pictured above.222  Beyond these fundamentals, however,
the statute specifically provides that "patents shall have the
attributes of personal property. '2 2 3 It is generally accepted that
state law governs such matters as devolution of patents on
death, 224 the fiduciary obligations of corporate officers and
employees to account for their own inventions or transactions in
the inventions of others,225 and even application of community
property concepts.
22 6
219. E.g., Eno v. Prime Mfg. Co., 314 Mass. 686, 50 N.E.2d 401
(1943). Contra, Measurements Corp. v. Ferris Instrument Corp., 159
F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1947). The view that there is no basis for implying an
agreement which creates rights greater than would exist under patent
law seems preferable.
220. E.g., Shaw v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 Vt. 206,
226 A.2d 903 (1967).
221. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(f), 116 (1970).
222. See Part II(C) supra.
223. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
224. See W. NAVIN, PATENTS 38-40 (rev. ed. 1966). See also Price v.
Block, 124 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1941); A. K. BERLE & L. DECAMP, INVEN-
TIONS, PATENTS, AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 357-58 (1959).
225. E.g., Grip Nut Co. v. Sharp, 150 F.2d 192 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 742 (1945); L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Falls, 307
Mich. 69, 11 N.W.2d 329 (1943).
226. Patent authorities widely assume the application of community
property law. E.g., W. NAVIN, PATENTS 40 (rev. ed. 1966); A. SMITH,
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Integration of such incidents of ownership as these with the
general fabric of state law is clearly sound. Litigation involving
such matters is seldom apt to include questions of patent validity
or interpretation. State law is not likely to intrude require-
ments which seriously detract from the purpose of the patent
laws to encourage discovery and innovative commercial exploi-
tation of discovered inventions.227  Property questions have
traditionally been left to state regulation, and it has long been
recognized that there is a particularly high interest in pre-
serving the role of state law in regulating intrafamily property
relationships. 228 No matter what conclusions are reached with
respect to express contractual transactions affecting patent
rights, the role of state law seems secure in this core area of
property interests and will not be discussed further.
Before turning to the final categories of miscellaneous appli-
cations of state law and direct state regulation of patent trans-
actions, however, express note must be made of one peculiar
problem of ownership which has repeatedly caused difficulty.
Ownership of an invention arises under state law until the pic-
ture is complicated by invocation of the patent laws..2 2 9  Mis-
appropriation of an as yet unpatented invention, however, may
be followed by issuance of a patent to the one who wrongfully
secured the invention. Such patents are void as a matter of fed-
eral law;230 at most, federal jurisdiction in cases growing out of
this sequence of events is limited to a declaration of the in-
validity of the resulting patent..2 3 1 State courts, however, have
PATENT LAw 1125 (rev. ed. 1964); Turner, Joint Ownership of Patents
is Dynamite, 42 Los ANGF ES BAR BuLL. 115 (1967). Cf. M. Nmm ,
COPYRIGHT § 80 (1963). Cases supporting this assumption are difficult
to find, although ambiguous support may be found in Finnegan v.
Finnegan, 64 Cal. App. 2d 109, 148 P.2d 37 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944); Lor-
raine v. Lorraine, 8 Cal. App. 2d 687, 701-02, 48 P.2d 48, 54-55 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1935).
227. The embarrassments of co-ownership, sketched in Part II(D), supra, might be thought to suggest that application of state com-
munity property law to patents would seriously interfere with effective
commercial exploitation. The lack of any indication of outrage with
the present situation suggests that in fact such difficulties have not re-
sulted, perhaps because of the powers of one spouse as manager of the
community.
228. Cf. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
229. Becher v. Contoure Labs., Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391 (1929). Cf.
LaChapelle v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 272 Mass. 465, 172 N.E. 586(1930).
230. Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 667 (1888).
231. Federal jurisdiction was accepted in Cummings v. Moore,
202 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1953), as seems clearly right. Nonetheless, juris-
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frequently been faced with suits brought by the inventor to
compel assignment of the patent. Federal courts have con-
sistently ruled that assignment is inappropriate since the only
purpose of ordering an assignment would be to facilitate an
imposition on the public by assertion of an invalid patent.282
Assignment has been ordered in varying circumstances by state
courts, however,233 apparently in response to the obvious ap-
peal of the true inventor's claims.
The strongest argument to be made for allowing state courts
to go their own way is that the misappropriation and issuance
of a patent have made it impossible for the true inventor to
maintain effective trade secret protection for his idea. His
failure to seek a patent himself, accordingly, does not justify
a conclusion that he has opted to forego all protection. Since
the patent's issuance carries a statutory presumption that the
invention is indeed patentable,2 3 1 the inventor should be allowed
the benefit of this protection instead of an often unsatisfactory
diction in such situations has frequently been refused. See Muskegon
Piston Ring Co. v. Olson, 307 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 952 (1963) (the decision may be right on the unexpressed ground
that priority should be ceded to pending Patent Office proceedings);
Eckert v. Braun, 155 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1946); Howard v. Archer,
115 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1940).
232. See Friedman v. Washburn Co., 145 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1944);
Koehring Co. v. National Automatic Tool Co., 257 F. Supp. 282, 289
(S.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 385 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1967); Tracer-
lab, Inc. v. Industrial Nucleonics Corp., 204 F. Supp. 101 (D. Mass. 1962),
rev'd on other grounds, 313 F.2d 97 (1st Cir. 1963); Crook v. Bendix
Aviation Corp., 68 F. Supp. 449 (D. Del. 1946).
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., Inc., 230 F.2d 855 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956), does not seem inconsistent with
this approach. The basis for ordering assignment of pending patent
applications was that the inventor had made the inventions while em-
ployed by the plaintiff, rather than that application had been made on
behalf of someone other than the inventor.
233. E.g., Transparent Ruler Co. v. C-Thru Ruler Co., 129 Conn. 369,
28 A.2d 232 (1942) [honored in Zachs v. Aronson, 49 F. Supp. 696
(D. Conn. 1943)]; Cohen v. Bunin, 183 Misc. 90, 47 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup.
Ct. 1944), affd per curiam, 270 App. Div. 929, 62 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1946),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 792 (1947). Assignment appears to be contem-
plated as an appropriate remedy in Zemba v. Rodgers, 87 N.J. Super.
518, 210 A.2d 95 (Ch. Div. 1965).
As long ago as Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 155 (1868), a court
faced with this dilemma concluded that it should not order assignment
of a fractional interest in a patent to a co-inventor since a decision rest-
ing on a finding of co-invention would carry with it a conclusion of
patent invalidity. This dilemma was adroitly evaded by confining re-
lief to issuance of a license-just why this distinction in relief was
thought to warrant a difference in the court's power is not explained.
234. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970).
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remedy against the wrongdoer alone. This argument, however,
is simply that the patent should not be held invalid in such
circumstances. Unless the federal courts can be persuaded as
a matter of patent law that this is so, state courts should refrain
from ordering assignment.
G. MISCELLANEous APPLICATIONS OF STATE LAW
Remaining applications of state law involve a wide variety
of problems, some of them susceptible of easy disposition and
some of them more complicated. Ordinary sale transactions, for
instance, may commonly involve a warranty by the seller that
the goods do not infringe patents owned by others, or a buyer
furnishing specifications may warrant that the seller will not
be guilty of such infringement in complying with the buyer's or-
der.23 5 Such warranties are closely bound up with the other
incidents of a transaction otherwise governed by state law and
seem to provide a relatively easy case for continued applica-
tion of state law.2 30  A tort claim for deceit in the sale of pat-
ent rights, on the other hand, seems indistinguishable from
other claims arising out of assignment contracts; the contin-
uing role of state law2 37 may thus easily be referred to the gen-
eral problems of assignment agreements.
Complex problems are immediately encountered, however,
when attention shifts to the use of state law to control claims of
interference with relationships between a patentee and present
or prospective licensees. One current example is provided by a
claim that a stranger had interfered with the plaintiff's exclu-
sive license by inducing the licensor to grant "permission" for
sale of the patented product;2 38 another is seen in claims that
a stranger is intruding on relationships between the licensor
and present or future licensees by assertions that the licensees
may engage in described conduct without owing royalties
and that the potential licensees may do so without infringe-
ment.2 39 In each of these cases there are alternative routes
through infringement law, either by a claim of infringement
or by a claim of inducing infringement. At the same time it is
235. UNroIO COVnVERCIAL CODE: § 2-312(3).
236. See Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897).
237. E.g., David v. Park, 103 Mass. 501 (1870).
238. American Harley Corp. v. Irvin Inds., 27 N.Y.2d 168, 263 N.E.2d
552, 315 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971).
239. Koratron Co. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 418 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 909 (1970).
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easily possible to imagine similar situations in which no infringe-
ment claim is available. A nonexclusive licensee, for instance,
might allege wrongful inducement of license termination; a li-
censor might allege interference in circumstances where no in-
fringing activity has resulted, and so on.
If, as proposed below, federal law should come to control
the underlying contractual transactions, the case for a concomi-
tant preemption of state law as to interference with such trans-
actions seems obvious. But so long as state law continues to
control licensing and assignment, the appropriate role of state
law is more obscure. In cases where actual infringement re-
sults, there is a compelling argument that there should be no
state remedy. If federal law allows an action for inducing in-
fringement, the policy of exclusive federal jurisdiction should
prevent resort to state jurisdiction by the simple means of chang-
ing the applicable label; and if federal law for some reason pro-
tects the defendant against liability for inducing infringement,
there is an implicit judgment of patent policy that the acts of
the defendant must be protected to further the public interest
in all means of competition wherever possible. Where infringe-
ment does not result, on the other hand, there seems to be little
reason to create a distinctive federal law to control interference
with actual or prospective contractual relationships governed
by state law. Instead, the role of federal law is again peripheral.
The clear federal policy in favor of encouraging challenges to
patent validity must require states to deny liability unless the
patent can be proved valid; even then the states must recognize
a privilege for reasonable claims, made in good faith, that speci-
fied conduct may be undertaken without violating the patent
laws.
2 4 0
The other frequently encountered area in which applica-
tion of state law gives rise to a complex interplay between
state and federal law involves suits for disparagement aris-
ing out of assertions that the plaintiff's products infringe a pat-
ent. It has long been accepted that such claims arise out of
state law.241 Just as with claims of interference with patent
240. See Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. Rsv. 633, 655-56 (1971).
Of course this dichotomy may well get state courts even more
deeply ensnarled with questions of patent validity and infringement.
This consequence, however, is but one small facet of the general re-
sults of applying state law to the underlying contracts.
241. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257
(1916); Utah Radio Prods. Co. v. Boudette, 78 F.2d 793 (lst Cir. 1935);
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contract relationships, however, it seems inescapable that fed-
eral law must impose some controlling limits. If a stranger has
a privilege conferred by federal law to make reasonable, good-
faith assertions of noninfringement, federal law should at least
control the determination whether a patentee is protected against
liability in making reasonable, good-faith assertions of infringe-
ment.2
42
Beyond this point, it is more difficult to determine whether
state law should be left free to control, even to the extent of de-
nying any claim for relief whatever. The federal interest in
ensuring the existence of some damages remedy for such abuse
of patents is very strong. Declaratory relief of noninfringe-
ment cannot by itself undo the damage caused by past asser-
tions of infringement; it is well known that assertions of in-
fringement aimed at a competitor's customers provide a highly
effective method of ending competition. Federal antitrust rem-
edies replete with treble damages, criminal liability, and esoteric
theoretical problems, are likewise insufficient to substitute for
a simple tort remedy. Nor is there any equivalent to the claim
of inducing infringement available to the patentee injured by
acts of a stranger. There is thus strong ground for concluding
that federal patent policy requires the existence of a tort remedy
for this category of patent abuse. If this conclusion is sound,
there is no apparent reason to adhere to the doctrine that state
law creates the cause of action. Federal control seems appropri-
Dynamic Instrument Corp. v. Fedtro, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.N.Y.
1967).
242. See Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. Rsv. 633, 649 n.7 (1971).
Compare Ostow & Jacobs, Inc. v. Morgan-Jones, Inc., 180 F. Supp.
38, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), rehearing denied, 189 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). The court concluded that state law would require the plaintiff
to prove invalidity or noninfringement of the patent, notwithstanding
the assumption of Mr. Justice Holmes in American Well Works v.
Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916), that the plaintiff need prove
only charges of infringement and subsequent damage to its business.
Although this conclusion seems eminently sound as a matter of dis-
paragement law, there is little reason to suppose that if state law con-
tinues to control the underlying cause of action, federal law should
control this particular division of responsibility for proof. It does not
seem an undue imposition for state law to include the basic questions of
validity and infringement as part of the good faith privilege.
Recognition of a good faith privilege, finally, must mean that the
state tort remedy is frequently less effective protection than a de-
claratory judgment action in which the issues of validity and infringe-
ment must be squarely decided. See H. Trautman, Federal Right
Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 V xV. L. Rsv. 445, 465 n.95
(1955).
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ate even if express contractual dealings in patents remain subject
to state law.243
H. DIRECT STATE REGULATION
There has been no difficulty whatever in concluding that
state law may control the use of patented inventions as such.24'
During the second half of the 19th century, however, states
reacted to widespread fraudulent practices by going beyond
this simple point to attempt direct regulation of patent licen-
sing and assignment transactions. Only a few of the statutes
remain in force today and they are apparently largely ignored.2'4
Their history, however, is of considerable contemporary inter-
est as a bridge to direct discusssion of the role state law should
play today in governing patent contracts. For, after state
and lower federal courts had repeatedly split on the validity
of these statutes, 46 the Supreme Court upheld them on grounds
which strongly suggest that Congress should take the lead in
reaching any decision to preempt state law.
The statute involved in the leading decision made it un-
lawful to sell any patent right in Kansas without first filing with
the clerk of the district court of the county in which the sale
was made a copy of the patent and an affidavit of its genuine-
ness and authority to sell. It further required that anyone tak-
ing a written obligation for a patent right insert the words
243. State law may become entangled with patents in a variety of
other tort contexts so esoteric as to deserve only footnote mention.
See, e.g., Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 738 (1944) (state law controls claim for wrongfully
delaying issuance of patent by Patent Office); American Securit Co. v.
Shatterproof Glass Corp., 166 F. Supp. 813, 825 (D. Del. 1958), aff'd,
268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959) (state law
controls claim that plaintiff was fraudulently induced to forego assert-
ing its patent rights against the defendant); Misani v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 44 N.J. 552, 210 A.2d 609, app. dismissed & cert. denied,
382 U.S. 203 (1965) (raising possibility of defamation claim for wrong-
fully naming someone other than the true inventor as inventor in a
patent application).
244. E.g., Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1878). See also
Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1881).
245. See, e.g., 4 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 222 (2d ed.
1965); R. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS 301-08 (3d ed. 1955).
Particularly complex dealings in patents may also be subject to
regulation by state "blue sky" laws. E.g., People v. Shafer, 130 Cal.
App. 74, 19 P.2d 861 (1933); Weisberger, State Control Over Patent
Rights and Patented Articles, 20 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 183, 259-60 (1938).
Cf. BLUE SKY L. REP. 1681.
246. The story is told in full detail in Weisberger, supra note 245.
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"given for a patent right" above the signature of the maker.
The ruling of validity was rested on the ground that although
Congress might well preempt all regulation of patent assign-
ments, its statutes relating to assignments did not indicate any
intention to do so. 247 Enactment of special legislation singling
out patent transactions was further found not to be an unrea-
sonable discrimination against federally created rights since
the states had reasonable grounds to believe that there were
particular dangers of fraud not involved with the sale of other
sorts of property.
Congressional enactments have not changed significantly to
the present day insofar as concern is focused directly on regula-
tion of patent contracts. Judicial perceptions of the role of
patents in a competitive economy, and even of the role of state
law with respect to regulating the competitive order, however,
have changed considerably. Now that the role of state law in
regulating patent transactions has been described and traced to
its origins, there remains only the prescriptive question: should
the courts, or should Congress, react to changing views of the
patent system to preempt state law in favor of a federal law of
patent transactions?
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF PATENT
AGREEMENTS LAW
A. GENEAIL APPROACH
Prescriptions for the desirable relationships between state
and federal law are strongly affected by the perspectives of
federalism from which the task is approached. Explicit confes-
sion of individual premises thus seems an appropriate preface
to any suggested diagnosis and cure. The following general
statement is meant to serve as such a warning, as well as an iden-
tification of the possible lines of analysis which seem rather
clearly unavailable to resolve the choice between a federal or
state law of patent agreements.
1. Deference to State Law
State regulatory competence is superseded by force of the
federal Constitution alone in only a few fields. By and large, the
mere existence of potential but unexercised federal power to
247. Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347 (1906). See also Ozan Lbr. Co. v.
Union County NaVl Bank, 207 U.S. 251 (1907); John Woods & Sons v.
Carl, 203 U.S. 358 (1906).
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regulate has been found to leave the field free for state control.
The primary role occupied by state law with respect to regulat-
ing or facilitating the major portion of human conduct, indeed,
gives rise to a principle that state law should be superseded
only for good reason. 248  As the Supreme Court recently noted,
"whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace
state law is primarily a decision for Congress."2 ' 9
This presumption of deference to state law has meant that
even when federal power is exercised in some way, it may often
incorporate state law to control various aspects of situations
which could readily be federalized. Such incorporation of
state law is accomplished both by statutory provision and by
judicial decision for a wide variety of reasons. At times defer-
ence is due to a recognition that state law has unusually impor-
tant claims to particular areas such as family relationships and
property arrangements integrated with family relationships.25 °
More generally, incorporation may rest on a desire to integrate
federal programs as nearly as possible with the ongoing gov-
ernance of daily transactions by state law. The purpose might
be either to avoid confusion and uncertainty, to respect specific
state policy judgments, or even to honor a more abstract prin-
ciple that it is desirable to subject the sovereign to the same
duties as are owed by private citizens. 25 1 At the extreme, fed-
248. See, e.g., H. M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 489, 497 (1954); Mishkin, The Various-
ness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of
National and State Rules For Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 814 n.64(1957); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512 (1969);
Note, The Competence of Federal Courts To Formulate Rules of De-
cision, 77 HILv. L. REv. 1084, 1085-86 (1964).
It may be possible to find some support for this presumption in
the unsatisfactorily ambiguous provisions of the Rules of Decision Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970). The most energetic statement of this view is
found in Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of Federal Common Law, 53
COLUM. L. REv. 991 (1953).
249. Wallis v. Pan American Petrol. Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).
250. E.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966) (Court ex-
pressly refrained from determining whether state law governs of its
own force or by incorporation into federal law); De Sylva v. Ballentine,
351 U.S. 570 (1957). Cf. Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Edward B. Marks
Music Corp., 425 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1969).
That federal law may nonetheless override state control of family-
property relationships is demonstrated by Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S.
306 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
251. The desire to respect specific state policy judgments may be
reflected by such arrangements as the subjection of branching rights of
national banks to state law. E.g., Howell v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank,
385 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1967) (nicely illustrating the federal measure
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eral law may adopt state law simply as a means of providing
the states with a more effective enforcement machinery than
they are able to provide themselves.252
State law may also be incorporated into federal law as a
means of supplementing inadequacies or gaps in the particular
federal scheme..2 53  A simple example is provided by the fre-
quent recourse to state statutes of limitations to govern federal
causes of action created without specific limitations periods;;2 54
in this area it would obviously be difficult for federal courts to
create the necessarily arbitrary periods as a matter of decisional
law.255 More bizarre examples exist as well; perhaps the most
extreme is provided by the provisions of the Civil Rights Act
that so far as the laws of the United States are not adapted to
preserving persons in their civil rights or do not furnish suitable
remedies or criminal penalties, state law is to be adopted.2 50
Specific instances of reference to state law may of course
rest on a mixture of reasons. The constant reference of federal
tax law to state law for creation and control of the relationships
which give rise to federal tax liability, for instance, may rest
of the extent to which state law is incorporated). The desire to place
the federal government in substantially the same position as private
actors for the protection of those injured by its activities may in part
underlie the express incorporation of state law into the Federal Tort
Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1970).
A combination of these various purposes is reflected in Trans-
america Ins. Co. v. Red Top Metal, Inc., 384 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1967),
which adopted state law to measure rights under the Miller Act, 40
U.S.C. § 270 (a) -(d) (1970), because of a desire to provide a substitute
protection to suppliers comparable to the protection of state lien laws
and to integrate the operation of the federal program with the daily
routine activities of citizens.
252. An illustration of classic proportions is provided by United
States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212 (1957). The Federal Black Bass Act
prohibits transporting any fish out of any state if the transportation
would violate state law. In Howard, the Court determined that the
federal statute is violated if transportation of the fish is prohibited by
state administrative regulations.
253. See H. M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 489, 498 (1954): ". . . Congress rarely enacts a
complete and self-sufficient body of federal law. The federal statutes
are full of references, both explicit and implicit, to the law of some
state." Compare Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
254. E.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
255. See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision,
105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 804 (1957).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970). See Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d
991 (9th Cir. 1971); Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MNn. L. REV. 1201, 1214-22 (1971).
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among other things on the desires to integrate federal law
with state regulation as far as possible, to avoid the need for
creating uniform federal rules on all of the enormous variety
of subjects which affect tax liability, and to equalize as far as
possible the impact of federal taxes on the widely various ar-
rangements which may result from state property and family
law.
2 5 7
Patent agreements might be thought to fall within some
of these special reasons for honoring state law. The specific
arguments in favor of state law will be addressed below;
for the moment, it should suffice to reiterate the basic premise
that state law should control unless some adequate contrary
reason appears.
2. Preemption of State Law
Notwithstanding the general policy of deference to state
law, federal law has of necessity superseded state law in a wide
variety of circumstances. Ordinarily, the outer limit of federal
preemption is the maximum reach of power in the political
branches of the federal government.2 58 Actual preemption de-
terminations, however, are usually based on some more con-
crete conflict with rather direct provisions of federal law or
257. The citations are so numerous that a potpourri of personalfavorites should suffice. General restatement and illustration of the
basic principles of reliance on state law and of ready resort to uniformfederal rules to supersede state law after it has been used to define thebasic relationships may be found in United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S.
190, 197, 204 (1971).
The ease with which judges eager to protect the federal fisc may
thwart attempted integration with state law is shown clearly in
United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286 (1970). The converse
problems created by the willingness of state judges to provide rulings
sought only for favorable tax consequences are suggested by the pro-
tective response in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
At times, reliance on state law may result in differences in federal
tax treatment resting more on the abstract theoretical development of
state rules than on practical differences in consequence. Thus in Con-
necticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 997 (D. Conn.
1971), proceeds of an action found to have been settled under the Con-
necticut wrongful death act were included in the decedent's estate
because the state statute rests on a survival theory of recovery on the
claim of the decedent, and recovery passes under his will or the laws
of intestate succession. Since it seems unlikely that many people af-firmatively plan disposition of the proceeds of a wrongful death action,
reliance on this feature to impose estate taxes on recoveries in a few
states, but not in others, seems to create purposeless differences.
258. See Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Con-
stitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024, 1070 (1967).
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with an express or implied Congressional intent to "occupy" a
more or less vaguely delimited "field" to the exclusion of any
additional regulation.
259
Reliance on supposed Congressional intent as a basis for
federalizing the law of patent agreements is not now possible.
The process by which state law was clearly recognized has been
set out at length above. Specific reminder need be made only
of the express determination, long ago, that Congress has not yet
enacted a statute depriving the states of power to directly regu-
late patent licenses and assignments.20  No subsequent Con-
gressional action provides any basis for supposing that Congress
has changed its intentions, although it may be that the lack of
Congressional action in so exotic an area provides scant support
for an argument that Congress specifically intends to continue
the present scheme of things.
Inability to rest decision on the comfortable pillow of im-
puted Congressional intent does not preclude federalization.
One obvious path to this result is direct Congressional enact-
ment; in the end, that will be the recommended result. Con-
gress must weigh the same considerations for and against fed-
eral takeover as would be weighed by the courts; it has the
unique additional advantage of being able to weigh them in a
sensitive political scale instead of a judicial scale which must
start with a heavy weight of presumed legitimacy on the pan of
state law. Judicial preemption is nonetheless possible, al-
though such direct consideration as is shown in recent decisions
declines to take any such step.2 61 The actual roles played in a
259. General statements in the area of federal common law are
provided by Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 383, 407 (1964); Hill, supra note 258, at
1037-38; Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and
Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules For Decision,
105 U. PA. L. R-v. 797, 800 (1957).
Selective citation from the vast body of decisions in which state
regulation is simply found to have been preempted without replace-
ment by a body of federal common law as such, would be a fatuously
misleading introduction to an area which has yet to meet a definitive
generalized statement
260. Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347 (1906).
261. The only directly applicable decision is Farmland Irrigation
Co. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732 (1957). In Bartsch v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 826 (1968), the court refused to develop a federal common law to
govern copyright contracts. Similarly, federal common law was held
unavailable to control an attempt to rescind a patent license agreement
on the ground that it had been procured on the basis of a judgment
obtained by bribery of a federal judge. See William Whitman Co. v.
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competitive economy by patents and agreements affecting pat-
ents may have changed significantly since the original alloca-
tions of competence were made. Certainly judicial perceptions
of those roles have changed considerably. Just as certainly, fed-
eral law has crept ever closer to the heartland of patent agree-
ments by changing the framework into which such agreements
must be fit. At a minimum it would not be clearly improper
for courts to conclude that the decisions of yesteryear should be
displaced.
Whether preemption results from Congressional or judicial
action, it will require creation of a detailed federal law of
patent agreements. If the courts act on their own, the federal
law will perforce be federal common law. In the past, federal
courts have created areas of federal common law, supreme over
state law, for a variety of reasons. Although identification of
the major lines of decision in terms of "areas" does not describe
either the reasons or the limits of such authority, it should suf-
fice for present purposes to note that such common law has
generally been recognized in four major areas.20 2 Federal courts
have declared their competence to create decisional law con-
trolling various matters involving relations with foreign coun-
tries, involving potential conflicts between the direct interests
of different states, 26 3 deriving from a grant of jurisdiction to the
federal courts, or governing transactions to which the United
States is somehow a party.2 4 Simple statement suffices because
none of these theories can apply to patent agreements.
Beyond these recognized areas, resort may be had to more
generalized principles for finding a need to supersede state law
without relying on a pretense that Congress has at some time per-
ceived the need. The following three sections will focus on
the major possible theories: 1) that implementation of the
policies implicit in the exclusivity of federal infringement juris-
Universal Oil Prods. Co., 125 F. Supp. 137 (D. Del. 1954).
A brief statement of one possible reason for preferring federal
common law is provided in Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Be-
tween State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REv.
633, 665 n.132 (1971).
262. A lengthy development of these four areas is provided by
Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Pre-
emption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024 (1967).
263. But cf. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
264. An example of the possibility that state legislatures may be
eager to protect their citizens against application of the notions of
federal judges in transactions involving the United States is provided
by United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 809 (5th Cir. 1971).
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diction requires federal control, 2) that the same result follows
from the need to provide a coherent body of uniform doctrine,
and 3) that continued state control must intrude unduly on im-
portant considerations of good, as well as merely uniform, pat-
ent agreements law. Offsetting these arguments is the danger
that federal law could not be satisfactorily integrated with sur-
rounding state law and the relationships created by it, or
that it might impose undue burdens on the federal courts. These
subjects deserve separate statement before the final weighing
is undertaken. The discussion will not distinguish between ju-
dicial and Congressional preemption until the concluding sec-
tion. As already noted, the considerations are largely the same,
and there is little basis for preferring an attempt at legislative
codification to a federal common law of patent agreements.
One final prefatory comment remains. It has frequently
been feared that decisions to create federal common law have
been followed by unduly timid development of its doctrines.20 5
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that more confidence
can now be placed in an active judicial concern to function in
the most creative common law traditions.2 0 Whatever else may
be said, it is beyond dispute that patent agreements should be
made subject to federal common law only if the federal courts
are prepared to work actively and imaginatively in developing
a sound body of precedent.
B. THE IMPEWATI OF ExcLusivrrY
The historical development of exclusive federal infringe-
ment jurisdiction has been traced earlier.2 0 7 The purposes of
uniformity and expertise which presumably provide at least
part of the reason for making the federal jurisdiction exclusive
have not been realized in any convincing fashion. Patents
suffer widely different mortality rates in the different judicial
circuits, 268 and it seems safe to assume that this lack of uniformity
265. E.g., L M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLum. L. RIv. 489, 534 (1954); Hill, The Law-Making Power
of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLu . L. Rnv.
1024 (1967).
266. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
267. See Part I(A) (1) supra.
268. See Masse, The Patent System and Economic Development,
46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 486, 491-92 (1971). The Eighth Circuit has recently
recognized its current harshness on patent validity. See Woodstream
Corp. v. Herter's, Inc., 446 F.2d 1143, 1150 (8th Cir. 1971). A more
sanguine view that the federal courts generally decide comparable
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
suggests, in addition, a lack of uniform development of the
desired expertness.
Probably the only fully effective way to achieve genuine
expertise and uniformity would be to accept one of the recur-
ring proposals to create a specialized tribunal devoted solely
to patent cases-certainly at an appellate level, and perhaps
at a trial level as well.2 69 Although the legal doctrines involved
in patent litigation are subject to understanding by any judge
with even moderate intuition of the difficulty of the underlying
inventive and innovative arrangements, actual application to
particular areas of highly specialized knowledge demands talents
and experience which few can claim. More fundamentally, the
highly subjective nature of the key judgment of obviousness 27 0
means that decision must be greatly affected by the trier's
perceptions of the importance and values of the patent system.
The arguments against creation of a specialized patent tribunal,
however, are very strong; at their core lie the propositions that
such an isolation of patent law would cause severe distortions
and would disrupt the acceptability of the patent system and
that judging itself requires an expertise which could not be fully
developed without exposure to the broad range of litigation.2 7 1
Rejection of the possibility of a specialized patent court
does not lead automatically to the conclusion that there is no
remaining force in the statutory policy of exclusivity. Fifty
state court systems might develop even broader disparities than
occur among 11 judicial circuits; legions of state trial judges
would surely have less opportunity to develop even occasional
patent expertise than the far more restricted numbers of fed-
eral district judges.
Beyond the interests of litigants, moreover, lie the policies
of achieving a uniformly expert measurement of the validity
of outstanding patents. The Supreme Court has made no se-
cret of the duty of the federal courts to apply standards of
patentability far higher than the standards often applied by the
issues in comparable ways was expressed several years ago by Judge
Evans. See Evans, Shall the United States Have a Special Patent Court
of Appeals?, 36 ILL. L. REV. (Nw. U.L. Rev.) 643 (1942).
269. An 6xample of past proposals may be found in S. REP. No.
1367, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. et. seq. (1938) (reprinted in 20 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 319 (1938) ).
270. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
271. A beautiful terse statement is provided by Rifkind, A Special
Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary,
37 A.B.A.J. 425 (1951).
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Patent Office.272 This hostility has been carried far enough
that many would find more than picturesque simile in the state-
ment that the statutory presumption of patent validity "is about
as formidable as a silk screen against a machine gun."2'-  Right
or wrong, it seems not unlikely that many state courts would
be beguiled by the instinctive reaction that if Congress has
created a patent system pursuant to express Constitutional au-
thorization, there must be some reason for it and therefore it
should be received hospitably. If the public interest in en-
forcing high standards of nonobviousness is as great as the
Supreme Court believes, this danger represents a strong argu-
ment that the policy of federal exclusivity should be both pre-
served and effectively enforced by means calculated to remove
questions of patent validity and infringement from the hands
of state courts.
Granting that the implied purposes of exclusivity represent
a strong interest, however, does not entail any significant sup-
port for the argument that the law of patent agreements should
be federalized. The conclusion that agreements not to infringe
should be preempted follows easily from the premise of exclu-
sivity as already shown. 2 7 4 State court handling of litigation in-
volving other forms of patent agreement may go on unabated
while ensuring federal consideration of all questions of patent
validity or infringement by providing for removal at the behest
of either party whenever such questions are raised in state
court.275 It would even be possible to provide for automatic
mandatory removal if the public interest were thought to over-
ride the simple convenience and wishes of the litigants.27 0
Such legislative action is so much easier to develop and to ad-
minister than the more complex possibilities open to the federal
courts by decisional development that it is by all odds the best
272. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1966).
273. Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 14 IDEA 571, 572 (1971).
Judicial approaches to the presumption are still varied even in state-
ments as to its weight. E.g., Woodstream Corp. v. Herter's, Inc., 446
F.2d 1143, 1149 n.4 (8th Cir. 1971); Kardulas v. Florida Mach. Prods.
Co., 438 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir. 1971).
274. See Part H1(E) supra.
275. See Part I(C) (2) supra.
276. Mandatory removal is possible; there is nonetheless little rea-
son to suppose that if the adversary interests of the litigants suggest to
both sides that the cause is better served in the state courts, the public
interest requires that that judgment be ignored. The greater inconveni-
ence which might be encountered in a more distant federal court, in-
deed, might mean that the case would be less effectively presented and
hence less effectively decided.
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
method of reform if the policies of exclusivity are thought suf-
ficiently important.27 7
Exclusive federal infringement jurisdiction, in short, does
not provide any strong support for federalization of patent
agreements law. Nonetheless, if other reasons for displacing
state law appear, the displacement would provide some added
support for the policies inherent in the current rule of exclu-
sivity.
C. UNIFORMITY
Uniformity, like motherhood, has strong traditional appeals
for support. Patent licensing is unquestionably a very wide-
spread activity.2 78 Assignments, co-owner agreements and other
possible arrangements are likewise common. Application of pe-
culiar doctrines of state law could conceivably intrude signifi-
cantly on the value of patent rights and on the ability of patent
owners to benefit the public by securing rapid, broad-scale im-
plementation of the patented inventions. Simple uncertainty as
to which state's law might apply to any given transaction could
prove debilitating, particularly as choice of law doctrine develops
further away from the arbitrary but old familiar rules. Inter-
national arrangements might be significantly impeded by the
absence of a unitary domestic law. It is easy to imagine posi-
tive benefits resulting from a uniform body of federal law de-
signed to ensure that patents may be effectively exploited to
the optimum point of benefit to the patent owner and to society.
Among the areas on which uniformity could be easily at-
tained and which closely touch upon the important core of patent
exploitation are such doctrines as the parol evidence rule, fraud-
ulent procurement of the patent agreement, assignability of rights
under the agreement, failure of consideration and eviction, the
need for a written memorial of agreement, implied warranties,
and rights to terminate for nonperformance.
Despite these theoretical attractions, it seems a safe infer-
ence that little practical difficulty has resulted from the present
application of potentially diverse state law. There is no evi-
dence of any unhappiness or concern on the part of patent prac-
titioners or even patent writers. Several reasons for this lack
277. Compare Note, The Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Cases
Involving Patents, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 461, 468 (1931) (suggesting that
the time may be too late to devise judicial solutions).
278. E.g., E. LOVELL, DOMESTIC LICENSING PRACTICES 1 (1968).
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of actual embarrassment may be guessed. In part, the ability
to choose the law of a single state as controlling may ease the
burden of any possible uncertainty.27 9 Additionally, uniformity
is intrinsically impossible on a wide range of issues of general
contract interpretation which are properly treated as resting on
actual or putative "intent" of the parties as drawn from the
unique circumstances of the particular arrangement in-
volved. 280  Patent lawyers, further, apparently assume that
there is little practical problem of divergence between dif-
ferent bodies of state law, assuming that there exists uniform
adherence to rules resting in tradition and some amount of per-
suasive authority.28'
The virtues of uniformity, moreover, may be as suspect as
the virtues of motherhood. Convincing warnings have been
sounded against falling into little-minded traps of pedagogical
concern for abstract uniformity and symmetry of legal principle
at the expense of the opportunities for improvement opened
up by developing experience under divergent approaches to
such legal facilities as private contract arrangements.282  Fed-
eral common law, further, would develop only over relatively
long periods of time; uniformity would not spring full-blown
from the decision to preempt..2 8 3
Nationwide uniformity, finally, would be achieved at the
expense of nonuniformity with the general contract doctrine
within individual states. Although it may be fair to expect
that persons dealing with such peculiarly federal creatures as
patents should be on guard to the possibility that distinctive
rules are involved, there are real difficulties arising from the
279. See text accompanying note 137 supra.
280. See, e.g., U.S. Inds., Inc. v. Camco, Inc., 277 F.2d 292, 297 (5th
Cir. 1960). The court stated that "[in the process of interpreting the
contract, we are not much aided by the formalized rules applicable to
Texas contracts."
281. E.g., 4 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTs 411 (1965):
"[s]tate and Federal courts have expressed similar doctrines for the
construction and interpretation of contracts, assignments, deeds or other
documents or instruments."
282. E.g., L 1. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLumV. L. REv. 48.9, 542 (1954); Mishkin, The Variousness of
"Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 813 (1957).
283. E.g., Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1512,
1519, 1530 (1969). Compare Judge Friendly's thought that it should
not be unusually difficult to achieve uniformity in such areas. Friendly,
In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383, 411 (1964).
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fact that patent transactions are often intermingled with other
transactions. 2
4
Balancing the arguments for and against uniformity does
not provide a ready answer. If the arguments for uniformity
preponderate, as they seem to, the balance is not overwhelming.
Certainly the conclusion does not provide reason enough for a
judicial preemption of state law; it lends only moderate support
to any proposal for Congressional preemption.
D. FEDERAL OCCUPATION
A federal need for intrinsically good rules may provide a
justification for preemption quite apart from the frequently
low independent values of uniformity as such. In the case of
patent agreements the federal need might be summarily stated
along the following lines.
The patent system represents a delicate balance between anti-
competitive and competitive features designed to serve both
to strengthen competition directly and to achieve by non-
competitive means the values sought to be achieved by foster-
ing competition. A patent represents a short term limitation on
competition enabling the owner to impose a charge for use of
his invention despite the fact that once the discovery has been
made there is no further economic "cost" in its free use by
everyone. Offsetting this loss are several gains: the reward of-
fered by the patent is a desirable incentive to invent; the pro-
tection against imitation afforded is essential support for the
investment and risk needed to transfer the patented invention
from its initial reduction to practice to successful commercial
exploitation; patent protection requires the patentee to pay the
price of disclosing his invention so that it may be practiced freely
by all following termination of the patent and may stimulate
further invention even during the patent's life.
Effective commercial exploitation of patents ordinarily
requires that at some point there be an assignment, one or more
licenses or some other form of agreement affecting the patent.
The federal courts have long since rejected the logic which
suggests that the purposes of the patent "monopoly" require that
the patentee be allowed to refuse access to his invention except
upon consent to whatever terms its value enables him to ex-
tort. Instead, a broad body of entirely federal "misuse" doc-
284. See Part III (E) infra.
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trine has grown up285 reflecting in essence a determination that
the desirable goals of the patent system can be attained under
rules which qualify the absolute rights of the patentee in order
to reduce the sacrifice of competition during the patent's life.
A similar process is required to implement the federal patent
policies as to the broader range of patent agreement doctrine as
well.
To be sure, many terms in patent agreements do not af-
ford the dramatic evidence of economic power afforded by exac-
tions typical of the practices posing past and present misuse prob-
lems, such as requirements tying other patent rights or unpat-
ented items to use of the desired patent, extending royalty pay-
ments beyond the life of the patent, defining the fields of use
permitted to the patentee, forcing "grant-back" of improvement
patents, controlling the selling prices of patented items, and
extorting extravagant or discriminatory royalties. Nonetheless,
the strength of the federal policies in favor of competition and
the completely federal nature of patent rights require that fed-
eral courts assert control over all terms of patent agree-
ments. Only through such control can there be any assurance
that patent exploitation through private agreement will afford
the patentee precisely the proper degree of advantage from his
patent
Considerable support can be found for this basic argument
in the various decisions in which the Supreme Court has al-
ready concluded that state law must give way before the over-
riding concern of federal law to ensure a proper balance of
competitiveness in the national economy. For many years the
federal courts have recognized the needs of the patent law as
such in controlling state contract doctrine conflicting with it.28 G
More recently, the pro-competitive policies embodied in the anti-
trust statutes have been drawn upon as well to support the
conclusion that the need to follow state contract law does not
apply
to those areas of judicial decision within which the policy of
the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that
legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by
federal law having its source in those statutes, rather than by
local law.28 7
Similarly, it has been recognized that within limits which
285. See Part II(B) (2) supra.
286. E.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
287. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176
(1942). See also, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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are still obscure, state law is prohibited from chilling com-
petition by affording protection against imitation similar to the
protection provided by patents, but resting on levels of quali-
tative advance in the art which do not satisfy the require-
ments of federal law.28
8
The borders of federal law, in short, are encroaching ever
further on the territories of state law which front on the federal
patent domain. In large part, this extension has resulted from
changed perceptions of the proper balance between competi-
tive and anticompetitive aspects of patent exploitation and
from rejection of any notion that the patent owner should be
left unfettered control over his own territory. Modem judicial
views of the nature and limits of patent rights have emerged
long since the time when state law was originally assigned its
role. The modem views do indeed suggest that it would be
better to oust the states from control of patent agreements un-
less there are strong contrary reasons or unless legislative views
of patent exploitation differ from judicial views. The possible
arguments against federalization are all that remain to be ex-
amined before turning to the final question of the proper means
of effecting preemption if it is in fact desirable.
E. INTEGRATION WITH STATE LAw
Despite the encroachments of federal law, state law con-
tinues to govern the vast run of ordinary affairs. It has al-
ready been suggested that state law may appropriately be al-
lowed to retain its present role with respect to the ownership of
inventions and patents.28 9 In addition, state law controls a wide
variety of relationships touching close upon the patent field, at
least in the sense of restricting freedom of competition in the
short run for the purpose of serving the long-range interests
of the competitive system. Liability rests in state law for mis-
use of trade secrets or other protectible "ideas" and for such
288. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). An ex-
treme push of the preemption doctrines reflected in these opinions and
in the opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,
677 (1969), has been halted, at least for the moment, in Painton & Co.
v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
Recent examinations of the difficulties bequeathed by the cloudy
opinions in Sears and Compco-as they are affectionately known-
include Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear,
59 CALIF. L. REV. 873 (1971); Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of
Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 17 (1971).
289. See Part II(F) supra.
[Vol. 56:313
PATENTS AND STATE LAW
broader areas of misappropriation of trade values as may re-
main viable,290 for the obligations of employees to share their
discoveries with their employers and not to compete during or
after employment, and for the transfer of going businesses and
associated "good-will" values. Transactions involving these
rights may, and frequently do, involve patent rights as well.
Sale of a business, for instance, frequently includes the sale
of patent rights; employees are frequently bound to license or
assign patents to their employers; trade secrets are often li-
censed along with patent rights; and so on. If federal law con-
trols the patent aspects of some or all of these transactions,
the result is that different sources of law must be sought for dif-
ferent parts of arrangements which are otherwise integrated
as a single unit.
One result of this division of competence would be that a
court adjudicating controversies growing out of such mixed trans-
actions would necessarily be applying the law of another sov-
ereign. Although this result is undesirable,2 0' it has been toler-
able in federal diversity jurisdiction and has been accepted
in the patent law areas examined above. Of itself, this result
does not weigh strongly against recognition of a federal law of
patent agreements.
A far more troubling consequence of this division of compe-
tence would be that in planning such transactions, different
bodies of law would have to be consulted. This difficulty leads
to the conclusions reiterated above that state law should con-
tinue to control "property" relationships and employment rights
which do not grow out of express agreement. Express agree-
290. See, e.g., Tape Inds. Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp.
340 (C.D. Cal. 1970), app. dismissed, 401 U.S. 902 (1971); Capitol Rec-
ords, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal Rptr. 798 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
291. Cf. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 826-27 (1957).
If, as proposed below, state courts are left with concurrent juris-
diction over cases involving patent agreements, there may also occur
problems involving the extent to which state procedure must give way
to federal practice to ensure proper enforcement of federal rights.
Cf. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
By and large, it seems unlikely that there will be much reason to
supersede state procedure, particularly since the implied belief in the
excellence of federal procedure does not mean that it can achieve
better results when thrust into the unwilling hands of state courts more
familiar with their own ways of doing things. Cf. H. M. Hart, Jr., The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 508
(1954).
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ments of license, assignment, or co-ownership, on the other
hand, involve intentional manipulation of patent rights which
clearly and obviously derive from federal law. Federal law
already imposes significant limitations on these arrangements
in the various ways explored above. Parties to such transac-
tions are thus on notice that they must consider federal law and
may fairly be required to heed that notice. Governance of ex-
press patent agreements by federal law, therefore, does not seem
to create untoward difficulties of integration with the body of
state law. Preemption in response to the positive reasons ad-
vanced above is accordingly a desirable result unless it is thought
to impose undue burdens on the federal courts.
F. BURDENS ON FEDERAL COURTS
One final protest might be lodged against arrogation of pat-
ent agreements to the hegemony of federal law. The purposes
underlying federalization require that federal courts be given at
least concurrent jurisdiction over disputes arising out of such
agreements.2 92 Burdening an already heavily laden court sys-
tem with further work inevitably raises questions about the
need to preserve the distinctive character and quality of fed-
eral courts against the dilution which could easily result from
continued expansion. Several answers suggest that this con-
cern does not weigh heavily in the present situation.
First, although there are no discoverable statistics for ei-
ther state or federal courts, the absolute volume of patent agree-
ment litigation is apparently not large. Second, much of this
litigation can be brought in the federal courts under appropri-
ate use of the jurisdictional doctrines outlined above or through
diversity jurisdiction. Third, the uneasy case for exclusive in-
fringement jurisdiction need not be extended to jurisdiction over
patent agreement suits. Instead, concurrent jurisdiction,
coupled with a right of removal in either party whenever it
becomes apparent that a patent agreement issue is involved,
292. Under the current jurisdictional statutes, it is highly likely
that federal jurisdiction would rest on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1970),
rather than the exclusive patent jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (1970), particularly if federal law rested on judicial deci-
sion alone. See note 101 supra. Cf. Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1968). The result would be ex-
clusive state court jurisdiction for actions involving less than $10,000
and concurrent jurisdiction for actions involving more than that juris-
dictional amount.
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should be sufficient to achieve the development of a good uni-
form federal law.
No strong reason appears, in short, to offset the persuasive
argument that there is a valid purpose to be served by creation
of a federal law of patent agreements.
IV. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
The extended discussion undertaken above has sought to
accomplish the primary tasks of description and prescription
of the role of state law with respect to patent rights. Descrip-
tion of the present role of state law has suggested that state
competence has been recognized largely in the process of allo-
cating jurisdiction to adjudicate between state and federal
courts, solidifying along substantially the present lines long be-
fore the emergence of present judicial perceptions of the appro-
priate role of patent rights in maintaining a competitive econ-
omy. Prescription for the future role of state law has suggested
that on balance, it would be better to allow creation of a body
of federal law to control express patent agreements. The final
question remains whether it would be better for the courts to
take the preemptive step or for the courts to await Congressional
action.
Three factors suggest that it would be better for the courts
to await Congressional action. First, there is the strong general
policy in favor of a political judgment to supersede state law. -2 9 3
This policy is particularly strong in the present situation since
the admittedly complex relationship between state and fed-
eral law294 has been long established without demonstrably
bad results. There is no really adequate basis to read into the
overall patent scheme a Congressional intent to preempt state
law in this area.29
5
Second, the strength of the argument for preemption rests
ultimately on the wisdom of current judicial concerns with lim-
iting the full sweep of private benefit which might be gained
from private patent agreements at the expense of the public
competitive good. Various legislative proposals are pending
which would at least seek to control the future direction of these
293. See Part II (A) supra.
294. See H. M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 489, 527-28 (1954).
295. Cf. Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Con-
stitutional Preemption, 67 CoLum. L REV. 1024, 1037-38 (1967).
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judicial concerns.296  Although such proposals might seem in
part to strengthen the basis for federal control of all aspects of
express patent agreements, 297 there is no reason for the courts
to presume this result.
Finally, transition to federal common law might conceiv-
ably involve some problems of departure from substantive state
rules relied upon in prior transactions. Since there are few
clearly developed and distinctive doctrines of state law, and
since there is small reason to suppose that federal law would
often depart markedly from state law, this danger does not seem
great. Nonetheless, legislative action could avoid such prob-
lems more easily, as by providing an arbitrary starting point
for the new federal law.
Congressional preemption could conceivably take the form
of an express code of patent agreements. The present mixed
federal and state body of law, however, affords little clear di-
rection for such a code. Instead, the area seems admirably
suited for an express creation of concurrent federal jurisdic-
tion, with a clear directive that the federal courts are to create
a body of federal common law binding on state as well as fed-
eral courts.298  Long experience with the creative federal law-
296. S. 643, § 301, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) provides for continued
state regulation of "contractual or other rights or obligations, not in
the nature of patent rights, with regard to inventions or discoveries,
whether or not subject to this title." This provision would be re-
written more exuberantly and express statutory provisions for misuse
doctrine would be added by amendments proposed by Senator Scott.
See 117 CONG. REC. S. 3400 (March 19, 1971) (Amendments 23, 24).
297. Senator Scott's Amendment 24, supra note 296, would add an
express provision to the Patent Code stating the right of a patent owner
or applicant to
waive or grant, by license or otherwise, the whole or any part
of his rights under a patent or patent application and for the
whole or any part of the United States, by exclusive or non-
exclusive arrangement with a party or parties of his selection.
Such legislation would at least provide a clear statutory foundation
for license agreements and might be thought to strengthen the implica-
tion that federal courts should be able to regulate the incidents of such
agreements.
298. Judge Friendly has lauded this legislative technique as one
which
permits overworked federal legislators, who must vote with one
eye on the clock and the other on the next election, so easily to
transfer a part of their load to federal judges, who have time
for reflection and freedom from fear as to tenure and are ready,
even eager, to resume their historic law-making function.
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 419 (1964).
In this context, there seems no reason to fear that such a command
would be found an overly broad delegation of legislative powers to
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making function might in time provide a basis for a legislative
restatement of the law; at present, the course of judicial law-
making seems far better.
The proposed legislation could be included in either the Ju-
dicial Code or the Patent Code. Despite the aesthetic losses
from cluttering the Judicial Code with specific jurisdictional
provisions, integration with related problems suggests this might
be the better course, particularly if federal jurisdiction of in-
fringement suits is to be kept exclusive. A single statutory sec-
tion could provide the exclusive infringement jurisdiction and
a concurrent patent agreement jurisdiction. Explicit provi-
sion should be made for control by a common federal rule of
decision wherever the case is tried. The revamped removal pro-
visions proposed by the American Law Institue 2 90 should then
be sufficient to provide for access to the federal courts in express
patent agreement cases. In view of the uncertainties in those
provisions, however, it would be better to add a further provi-
sion allowing removal to federal courts, regardless of the amount
in controversy, of any state court litigation not involving ex-
press patent agreements in which questions as to the validity or
scope of any patent are involved.
the courts. See Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024, 1030 n.33 (1967).
For there is an ample body of specific patent agreement law and gen-
eral contract law to provide guidance in the general nature of the
judicial duty.
Some specific matters, of course, require legislative action if they
are to be accomplished at all. If it is thought desirable to require
written evidence of license agreements, for instance, it would be diffi-
cult to depend on courts to create a judicial statute of frauds.
299. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETwEN STATE
FEDERAL CouRTs § 1312(a) (1968). See note 113 supra.
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